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Abstract
Throughout the extensive discussions of the determinants of Korean
economic success, one factor is noticeably absent. Attention is rarely called
to the supportive role that the Korean labor market has played over the last
twenty years. Certainly one of the lessons of the Korean experience is the
contribution a responsive labor force can make to economic growth.
In this paper, recent macroeconomic events serve as a backdrop to
examining a variety of aspects of the Korean labor market. The evolution of
the wage structure of Korea's formal economy is analyzed according to sectoral
dimensions as well as worker and firm characteristics. In addition to
analyzing issues concerning wage trends and wage structure, aspects of Korean
compensation systems and employment contracts are examined. The economic
implications of the extensive system of nonbasic-wage payments, i.e., bonuses
and allowances, are reviewed as is the notion that Korean enterprises rely on
Japanese-style permanent employment contracts.
The paper concludes by comparing wage and productivity trends over
the last decade in an attempt to understand the basis for domestic price
inflation. Both cost-push and demand-pull explanations are evaluated.
Lastly, a technical Appendix revielws sources of Korean labor market data.
This review suggests that a far vaster urban informal employment sector
exists than is usually portrayed in discussions of the Korean economy.
Extracto
En todos los extensos analisis de los factores determinantes del _xito
econ6mico de Corea, hay uno cuya ausencia es nozable. Rara vez se destaca la
funci6n de apoyo que ha cumplido el mercado laboral coreano en los ultimos
veinte ainos. Sin duda, una de las lecciones que ensenia la experLencia regis-
trada en Corea es el aporte que puede hacer una fuerza laboral sensible al cre-
cimiento economico.
En este documento se utilizan ciertos sucesos macroeconomicos recien-
tes como tel6n de fondo para examinar diversos aspectos del mercado laboral
coreano. Ta evolucion de la estructura salarial de la economia formal de Corea
se analiza de acuerdo con las dimensiones sectoriales y las caracteristicas de
los trabajadores y de las empresas. Ademas de analizarse las cuestiones relati-
vas a las tendencias y estructura salar4ales, se consideran aspectos de los sis-
te.mas de rernuneracion y de loS contratos de trabajo de Corea. Se estudian las
repercusiones economicas del vasto sistemna de oagos no incluidos en eL salario
basico, es decir, bonificaciones y asignaciones, y se examina tambien el con-
cepto de que las empresas coreanas utilizan contratos de trabajo permanente al
estilo de los japoneses.
Este documento termina con una comparacion entre las tendencias del
salario y de la productividad en la uiltima decada, para tratar de comprender
cual es la base de la inflacion de los precios internos. Se evalua tanto la
explicacion que se basa en el alza de los costos como la que se fundamenta en la
presi6n de la demanda. Por ultimo, en un apendice tecnico se estudian las fuen-
tes de los datos relativos al mercado laboral de Corea. Este estudio indica que
existe un sector de empleo informal urbano mucho mras vasto que el que suele des-
cribirse en los analisis de la economia de Corea.
Les etudes circonstanciiies qui sont faites sur les causes de la
reussite economique de la Coree omettent un facteur important : on ne
parle que rarement du r6le positif que joue le marche du travail depuis
vingt ans dans ce pays. Or, l'impact d'une main-d'oeuvre dynamique sur
la croissance 6conomique est certainement l'une des leqons a tirer des
r6sultats obtenus par la Coree.
Dans l'etude presentee ici, les phenomenes macro-economiques
recents servent de toile de fond Ai l'analyse de divers aspects du marche
du travail en Coree. On y examine l'volution du bareme des salaires
dans l1economie structuree, d'abord par secteur mais aussi selon les
caracteristiques des travailleurs et des entreprises. On y etudie non
seulement les tendances et la structure des salaires, mais aussi certains
aspects des systemes de remuneration et des contrats de travail. On y
analyse les implications 6conomiques du systeme generalis6 de
remuneration autre que par un salaire de base, a savoir sous forme de
primes et dtindemnit6s, et l'idee que le succes des entreprises coreennes
repose sur des contrats de travail permanients, a l'instar du Japon.
L'etude compare ensuite les tendances des salaires et de la
productivite au cours des dix dernieres ann6es en vue de mieux comprendre
les causes de l'inflation des prix internes : elle evalue le r6le
respectif de l'inflation par les couts et par la demande. Enfin, une
annexe technique passe en revue les sources des donnees concernant le
marche du travail coreen. I1 ressort de cette etude qu'il existe en
milieu urbain un secteur non structur6 de l'emploi bien plus important
que ne le laissent g6neralement supposer les descriptions de l1'conomie
coreenne.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
A. Background
Over a span of twenty years the Republic of Korea has transformed
itself from a poor and backward agrarian nation into a modern industrial
society. Between 1960 and 1980 real GNP per capita is estimated to have
grown at an annual average rate of 7% - an increase almost unparalleled in
international experience. ALong with sustained increases in GNP per capita
the nation has registered significant improvements in almost every other
index of economic growth and development.
Considerable research has been undertaken into the primary
causes and determinants of Korean economic growth. Such research has been
motivated not only by the desire to explain Korean history but also by the
hope that lessons learned from Korean experience might be successfully
applied to other nations who thus far have witnessed less satisfying economic
development. Among the most common factors mentioned as determinants of the
Korean growth miracle are the magnitude and impact of foreign aid, the
significance of education in Korean culture, and the role of specific
government policies and interventions in the fields of agriculture,
industrial development and especially export promotion./L Throughout the
debate on the determinants of Korean economic success, one factor is often
noticeably absent. Attention is rarely called to the supportive role that
the Korean labor market has played over the last twenty years. And yet,
without this support, the successful transformation of the Korean economy
could not have been achieved. Understanding how a relatively backward
agrarian population evolves into a modern industrial work force in the space
of a generation is likely to reveal much about the success of the entire
economy. Certainly one of the lessons of the Korean experience is the
contribution a responsive labor force can make to economic growth.
Having achieved so rapid a transformation of the economy, Korea
now faces new economic problems, many of which involve the labor market.
The macroeconomic events of the last ten years have produced rapid growth in
output, exports and real wages. High inflation followed by growing unem-
ployment and decreasing export competitiveness have also characterized the
recent past. In many ways these recent economic troubles should not have
been unanticipated. The export-led strategy of the late 1970s placed Korea
in a vulnerable position to the vagaries of international economic condi-
tions. The impact of slack export demand in the early 1980s and the entrance
/1 See Mason et. al. (1980) for a complete review of these hypotheses.
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of new competitors in the international arena are likely to have been as
responsible for recent economic problems as were purely domestic
developments.
With recent macroeconomic events as a backdrop, this report
examines a variety of aspects of the Korean labor market. The allocative
properties of the market are first considered and offer insight into the
fundamental dynamics of Korean wage determination. After having established
some basic properties of the labor market, the report goes on to examine the
impact of wage trends on domestic price inflation.
B. Organization and Primary Findings
Although rich in statistics, some major weaknesses in Korean labor
market information exist. Specifically, by comparing the household based
survey of the economically active population with establishment-based wage
and employment surveys, official sources are found to account for the
earnings of only one third of total private, nonagricultural employment. In
other words, according to available sources, some two-thirds of Korea's
private, nonagricultural work force belongs to the small-scale or informal
economy for which no wage data exist. The majority of the nonagricultural
work force appears to be engaged primarily in service activities operating
as self-employed or family workers. What is striking about these results is
their suggestion that a far vaster urban informal employment sector exists
than is usually portrayed in discussions of the Korean economy. Addi-
tionally, these findings limit in scope the generalization on wage and
employment which can be safely drawn from the available data. (The Appendix
to this report reviews in detail sources on Korean wage employment.)
With these limitations in mind, Chapter 2 considers real earnings
trends in manufacturing and the rest of the formal economy. Chapter 2 is
generally concerned with the allocative and signalling properties of the
labor market and relies on earnings trends and the evolution of the wage
structure to document these properties.
The manufacturing sector experienced significant real earnings
growth from the mid-1950s through the late 1970s. As employment in this
sector expanded, real earnings increased by close to 60% throughout the 1960s
and doubled in the 1970s. 1980 marked the first decline in real earnings
in at least two decades. Other formal economic sectors experienced relatively
analagous real earnings movements.
The earnings trends of the formal economy suggest that the Korean
economy had passed through the Lewis phase of surplus labor by the
mid-1970s. The sustained wage increases of the period 1976-79 are difficult
- 3 -
to reconcile with any other interpretation of the changing long-run elasti-
city of labor supply. Real wage stagnation and erosion in the post-1979
period is seen not as proof of a reemergence of a surplus labor situation
but rather as an indication of the labor market's response to cyclical dis-
turbances. Use of a surplus labor model to depict the contemporary Korean
economy is seen as an incorrect macroeconomic framework for the 1980s.
Concerning more microecorLomic indications of allocative behavior,
Section B examines movements in the interindustry earnings structure between
1970 and 1981. Stability in the ordinal ranking of industries is in
evidence. Compression of the interindustry earnings structure is also
apparent especially since 1975. Th,is compression suggests significant wage
competition for workers during this period.
Another dimension of the formal economy's interindustry earnings
structure which is considered, is a. comparison of public and private
earnings. No obvious trend toward, so-called, public sector wage leadership
is revealed by this comparison. Although the public sector may provide
significant wage signals to the rest of the economy, the evidence does not
maintain that public sector wage settlements dominate private sector wage
agreements.
In Section C, the "'demographic" dimensions of the wage structure
are considered. Starting with earnings differentials by sex, it is noted
that male wage premiums are inversely correlated with level of education.
However, even after adjusting for level of educational attainment, male/
female earnings ratios show virtually no secular compression during the
1970s. The data suggest that female workers, even with their lower reser-
vation wages, failed to dampen male wage increases even during the late
1970s peak labor demand. This revealed low elasticity of substitution
between the sexes suggests an institutional distortion in industrial labor
costs which may impose, at least in the long run, inefficiency costs on the
economy.
The wage structure according to education reveals large
differentials between college and high school graduates and smaller
differentials between workers with high school versus middle and primary
school educations. The intertemporal pattern of these differentials,
especially for men, appears to track the relative scarcities of educated
labor. In the early 1970s differentials widen but by the late 1970s when
supplies had significantly expanded differentials held firm during the high
growth years and subsequently declined as labor demand leveled off in the
1980s.
The Korean government's stated desire of the past few years to
reduce wage differentials appears consistent with market forces. Policy
makers are, however, cautioned not to accelerate these trends beyond the
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dictates of the market. Undesirable consequences, such as the substitution
of educated for uneducated labor, may result from forced wage tapering and
may represent a costly mechanism for achieving equity objectives.
Section D considers earnings behavior according to firm size,
region and a number of other parameters related to the firm. The results on
earnings by firm size are particularly strong. Although larger firms pay
more throughout the period under consideration a substantial reduction in
the large firm premium is realized over time. In 1970, for example, workers
in manufacturing firms of 500 or more employees made almost 2 1/4 times what
workers in the smallest firms, 5-9 employees, earned. By 1980 this dif-
ferential had fallen to a large firm premium of under 75%. Coincident with
this compression in the wage structure, the small firm sector continued to
thrive, suggesting that wage and productivity developments were well aligned
and that wage dynamics may have been more market than institutionally
enforced.
Wage compression in the manufacturing sector according to region of
employment also showed considerable narrowing over the 1970s. Reduction in
regional wage differentials due to firms competing for workers appears
stronger than the dual of workers competing for jobs. This inference is
based on the movement of earnings differentials during peak versus slack
periods of labor demand.
Chapter 3 moves away from strict inspection of allocative issues
towards more institutional aspects of the wage payment system. In
particular, the composition of the compensation package and the nature
of permanent employment contracts are discussed.
Korea has inherited, adopted and adapted aspects of the Japanese
labor and industrial relations system. Concerning compensation, the
Koreans also rely on an array of bonuses, allowances and fringe benefits in
their remuneration package. Bonus payments, namely payments which vary
according to the success of the enterprise, and overtime pay account for 30%
of average total compensation in the formal economy. This percentage has
been growing throughout the 1970s as firms have chosen to increase bonus
payments rather than basic wages.
Such behavior on the part of firms can be explained in terms of
the added flexibility the bonus sytem provides. As bonuses increase, an
increasing proportion of the wage bill becomes a variable as opposed to
fixed cost, at least in the short run. Firms also prefer granting pay
increases through bonuses because the level of most fringe benefits is
legally tied to basic wages not to total cash compensation. Total labor
costs can thereby be reduced by minimizing increases in basic wages.
The economic implication of this growing reliance on nonbasic
wage compensation are varied. The system passes on some of the risk of
business activity to workers since both profits and wage bonuses can vary
- 5 -
with the firm's economic success. The system is also likely to disguise true
levels of inter-firm compensation and thus limit the information available in
the labor market.
While Korean firms may have adopted the Japanese bonus system, it
is less clear that permanent or lifetime employment contracts have been
similarly transferred. Although the information is often contradictory, a
review of scholarly works by Korean labor market specialists, discussions
with Korean businessmen and economy-wide data on job turnover and worker
commitment to individual firms, suggests that permanent employment is not
the rule in Korean establishments. If anything, firms pressured by govern-
ment have a greater responsibility toward maintaining workers than workers
have toward their attachment to enterprises.
The economic implications of these findings suggest that the
economy can have continued confidence in labor's mobility which will
support development of new economic sectors. Furthermore, government
may have to assume greater responsibility in insuring incomes and employ-
ment during cyclical downturns, since firms will not automatically bear this
burden as part of existing institutional arrangements. Lastly, the lack
of employment guarantees suggests the need for improvements in industrial
and labor relations institutions to facilitate worker-management dialogue.
In the report's last chapter, Chapter 4, entitled, "Wages, Prices
and Productivity" the impact of recent wage developments on domestic price
inflation is considered. Throughout the 1970s the rate of wage increases
exceeded the rate of price increases. Furthermore, during the late 1970s,
rapid wage growth was coincident with accelerating price increases and
preceded the high inflation of 1979-81. However, these findings need not
imply that cost-push rather than demand-pull was at the heart of the
wage-price spiral. Demand pull extplanations are also consistent with the
rapid growth of the Korean economy during these years and along with
accomodation by monetary authoritiLes, may help to explain the cause of this
round of increases in the Korean price level.
While Chapter 4's discussion of wage and price inflation is
primarily devoted to reconciliation between basic data and alternative
theories of inflation, some attent:ion is focused on policy prescriptions.
In particular, the institution of mandated wage controls in the event of
future episodes of price inflation is discouraged, since the structural
determinants of such inflations may not stem from the supply side of the
labor market. By imposing such controls, wage increases may be dampened at
the price of potential bottlenecks and generally inefficient operation of
the labor market.
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C. The Role of Government in the Wage Setting Process
Throughout this report the position that government has had a
lagging not leading role in the wage determination process is maintained.
This position is likely to be disputed by some individuals familiar with the
Korean labor market. This is not to say that the government was uninvolved
or that laissez-faire is an appropriate characterization of the market.
What is instead being suggested is that market forces are likely to have
dominated wage and employment outcomes, and that wage and employment trends
were not independently determined as a consequence of government wage
guidelines or mandated employment policies.
Defending this position is not as easy as it might first appear.
During the period under consideration, roughly 1970-1982, the government
never had a formal apparatus for wage controls akin to what has existed
or does exist in other nations. However, wage guidelines have been periodi-
cally announced throughout this period and have been enforced through the
web of government, labor and industrial relations which characterizes the
Korean economy. The organized financial sector may also have played a role
in this implicit system of control, compromise and persuasion.
Between 1975 and 1978, the government appears to have favored some
administrative guidelines on minimum levels of basic wages. By 1979, offi-
cial spokesmen were encouraging adoption of national productivity growth as
a wage guidepost. Public statements in 1980 through 1981 altered this posi-
tion as they urged the parties involved to reach their own accords. By
early 1982 no official stance was being taken although some members of the
government planning community did favor wage settlements limited to a single
digit. If anything, this accounting of government wage policy highlights
its implicit and variable nature. It appears that the government "has kept
its ear to the ground" and has avoided significant departures from the
dictates of market forces. Even if such departures may have been advised
they have rarely been long term in nature. This flexible approach towards
influencing labor market outcomes should be encouraged because it is likely
to have been a key element in maintaining the responsiveness of the labor
market to the needs of Korean economic growth.
As Korea faces increasingly more complex macroeconomic distur-
bances such as the high inflation of the late 1970s and the current economic
recession, the imposition of labor market controls may appear as attractive
expedients for ameliorating immediate problems. However, by not getting at
the structural roots of these problems, and by only dealing with their
manifestations in the labor market, such solutions may impose long run
efficiency costs on the economy in return for short run benefits. Such
trade-offs should be avoided.
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2. WAGE TRENDS AND WAGE STRUCTTURE
A. Wage Trends--An Overview
An understanding of Korean wage dynamics is aided by considering
the macroeconmic transitions of the last few decades as reflected in
available earnings data. Starting from the late I050's, these data trace
Korea's transition from a Lewis type surplus labor economy through the
business cycles of the mid-, to late 1970's and early 19qo's. An appre-
ciation of this 20 year wage history lends perspective to recent events.
The Mining and Manufacturing surveys and censuses date back to
1955 and have been undertaken annually since 1969./I Although representing
only a small percentage of the total work force, earnings trends in this
sector are a good proxy for wage movements in the formal economy. Table 1
presents the nominal and real earnings trends for the manufacturing sector
for 1955-1980. The data reveal the considerable real wage gains of
employees in this sector. As the manufacturing sector has grown, so have
the levels of pay. Over the decade of the 1960's real increases of close to
60% were achieved while the 1970's saw real earnings in manufacturing more
than double.
/1 The Mining and Manufacturing surveys and censuses as well as all the
other wage and employment surveys mentioned in the text are fully
described in the Appendix.
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Table 1: AVERAGE EARNINCS IN MANUJFACTUJRING (1955-19RO)
(in '000 won/annum)
Real Earnings
Nominal Index number X change from
Year Earnings (1q75 won) (1975 = 100) previous year
1955 15 185 40.3
1958 24 203 44.2 3.2/a
1963 40 216 47.n 1.37a
1966 67 22n 47.9 0.67fa
1967 82 242 52.7 1n.o
1969 129 305 66.4 13.0/a
1970 15Q 324 70.6 6.2
1971 190 341 74.3 5.2
1972 216 347 75.6 1.8
1973 267 416 90.6 19.9
1974 347 435 94.8 4.6
1975 459 459 100.0 5.5
1976 587 509 110.9 10.9
1977 759 597 130.1 17.3
1978 1,050 723 157.5 21.1
1979 1,378 802 174.7 10.9
1980 1,759 795 173.2 -0.9
/a The percentage change is the computed average annual percentage change
over the relevant interval.
Source: All data are originally from the Mining and Manufacturing Survey or
Census. Collection of these data has been the responsibility of
various agencies, including, in chronological order: Bank of
Korea, Korean Reconstruction Bank and Economic Planning Board. For
the years 197n-1979, the data are from the tabulations of the Small
and Medium Industry Randbook (1980).
The late 1970's were a period of rapid growth in the Korean economy
and for four consecutive years, 1976-1979, earnings in manufacturing increased
at a pace far above the previous historical trend. What must be emphasized
about this period was not only the high level of real earnings growth, but
that this level was sustained for so many years. In two earlier periods--
1967-1969 and 1973--significant increases also occurred, but they were,
respectively, of a smaller magnitude and relatively short lived. Lastly,
the decline in real earnings in 1980, even though it measured less than one
percentage point, stands as a major departure from more than two decades of
annual real wage gains.
- q -
In order to illustrate that the manufacturing sector's earnings
trend does not represent an isolated event in the movement of Yorean wages,
Table 2 presents earnings series for manufacturing and for private non-
manufacturing employment in the for-mal economy. These series are derived
from the Monthly Wage Survey and extend from 1970 through 1981. According
to the Monthly Wage Survey, the share of formal employment of the
nonmanufacturing group averaged approximately 30% during the 1970's.
Table 2: AVERAGE REAL EARNINGS IN THE FORMAL ECONOMY (1970-82)
('000 won/annum)
Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing
Index % change Index % change
number from pre- number from pre-
Year (1975 won) (1975=100) vious year (1975 won) (1975=100) vious year
1970 350 75.9 - 572 75.9 -
1971 358 77.7 2.4 597 7q.2 4.4
1972 365 79.3 2.0 651 86.3 9.0
1973 417 90.6 14.3 681 90.3 4.6
1974 454 97.4 8.8 731 96.9 7.3
1975 461 100.0 1.4 754 100.0 3.1
1976 538 116.8 16.8 931 123.5 23.5
1977 654 141.9 21.5 1,104 146.4 18.6
1978 767 166.6 17.4 1,328 176.1 20.3
1979 834 181.2 8.7 1,374 182.2 3.5
1980 795 172.7 -4.7 1,310 173.7 -4.7
1981 775 168.2 -2.6 1,278 16q.5 -2.4
Source: Ministry of Labour, Monthly Wage Survey.
The Monthly Wage Survey results portray manufacturing and the rest
of the formal economy experiencing very similar earnings trends over the
1970-81 period. Once again, the pattern of relatively modest real wage
growth (1970-75), followed by extremely rapid growth (1976-78), followed by
declining real growth (1980-81) is apparent. The magnitude and exact
timing of real wage change does, however, vary between manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing. This is due, to a large extent, to the volatile wage
patterns of the construction sector (this point will be elaborated upon
below).
The evidence of a recent reversal in earnings trends since the late
1970's is consistent with the general slack in the Korean economy and with
the absolute decrease of over 100,000 workers employed in the formal sector.
This reversal highlights the worsening income position of Korean labor.
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In Figure I, the similarity between the long run real earnings
trends of the manufacturing /1 and nonmanufacturing sectors are again
presented. Having established these trends, it is now possible to interpret
them in terms of Korean macroeconomic developments. The model most often
applied to the Korean economy has been of the Lewis surplus labor type.
Briefly, these models see modern sector growth fueled by relatively cheap
labor until the point when marginal productivity wage setting characterizes
the traditional sector. At this point, the so-called "commercialization
point," wages in both the modern and nonmodern sectors reflect productivity
criteria and are seen as part of a sectorally integrated process of wage
determination.
The value of assessing Korea's position within the Lewis model is
to determine how much, if any, surplus labor exists to fuel future indus-
trial expansion. The relatively gradual real growth in the manufacturing
earnings series prior to 1967, and maybe even to 1975, probably reflects a
variety of factors including an increasing skill mix of employment within
the sector and/or changing institutional arrangements in wage setting. In
general, this period is consistent with the surplus labor phase. However,
from 1976-1979 it would be difficult to attribute the sustained increases in
real wages solely to nonmarket forces, given that neither union power nor
government involvement in wage determination was a significant factor during
this period. Furthermore, the rapid acceleration of the Korean economy
during these years suggests that market forces were working in the direction
of increasing labor earnings. Although it may remain a matter of debate
when Korea passed its commercialization point, the evidence suggests that
labor surplus, in the Lewis sense, had been absorbed by the mid 1970's.
/1 It should be noted that the results on the manufacturing sector from
the two surveys are not identical. Differences can be attributed to
a number of factors including:
(a) differences in coverage (Mining and Manufacturing surveys
include small establishments);
(b) differences in collection period (the Monthly Wage Survey is an
average of monthly earnings while the Mining and Manufacturing is
an annual figure); and
(c) the Mining and Manufacturing survey uses a broader definition of
remuneration and includes more components of labor costs.
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FIGURE I
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The rapid acceleration in real wages in the late 1970's suggests
that a long run, elastic labor supply curve no longer faces Korea's indus-
trial sector. The narrowing of the urban/rural household income gap, cited
by Bhalla (197q), further suggests the integration of the nation's labor
market and runs counter to the dualism model's claim of institutional wage
determination in the traditional sector. If a situation of elastic labor
supply prevails in the next few years it is likely to reflect short run
cyclical phenomenon not a secular tendency as depicted by a surplus labor
model. What this implies for anticipated pressures on industrial wages is
that they are likely to be low until unemployment rates, for given skills,
again reach their frictional points.
B. The Interindustry Wage Structure
The manufacturing/nonmanufacturing earnings trends presented above
can be complemented by finer disaggregations by industrial subsector.
Table 3 presents monthly real earnings trends for manufacturing, commerce,
construction, finance, personal services and transportation industries./1
These same trends are illustrated in Figure II.
/1 The Monthly Wage Survey includes mining and electricity as two addi-
tional major classifications. Given their relatively low levels of
employment, in 1981 they represented 2.5% and n.n% of total private formal
employment, and for brevity's sake, they have not been included in
Table 3. Note also that construction with 83,724 workers, representing
a 3.2% employment share in lql, is also a relatively small sector, but
its earnings volatility makes it an interesting special case. Lastly,
far more detailed earnings series, down to the 5-digit SITC level, can
be constructed within manufacturing industries. For present purposes
this seemed unnecessary.
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Figure 1: Monthly Real Earnings by Economic Sector
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Table 3: MONTHLY REAL EARNINGCS BY ECONOMIC SECTOR
(in '000 1975 won)
Manufactur- Finance, Personal Transport,
Year ing Commerce Construction etc. Services etc.
1970 29 40 49 77 50 38
1971 30 In 48 79 52 38
1972 30 41 51 85 57 43
1973 35 45 57 95 58 45
1974 38 45 55 92 59 46
1975 38 53 62 96 67 46
1976 45 65 100 107 85 56
1977 54 71 122 120 103 70
1978 64 85 153 142 112 82
1979 70 92 144 143 123 92
1980 66 95 116 127 124 92
1981 65 91 117 124 126 87
1982 /a 64 87 114 115 123 89
/a Average of January and February.
Source: Monthly Wage Survey.
The data suggest considerable stability in the ranking of inter-
industry earnings over time with only the construction sector showing signi-
ficant relative wage changes./I The stability of the interindustry earnings
structure is maintained over a period of rapid real wage growth in all
sectors. These events are consistent with results from other nations, where
interindustry wage rankings are found to be similarly stable over time.
Furthermore, the relatively inferior earnings level in manufacturing and
/1 The construction sector in Korea, as is likely to be the case in nations
such as Pakistan and the Philippines, underwent a dramatic change during
the 1970's due to opportunities in the Persian Gulf. Construction, in
essence, historically a nontradeable became a tradeable, and one which
suffers from considerable exposure to worldwide business conditions.
The volatility of construction wages are a reflection of these circum-
stances. What is also blurred by the formal economy statistics is the
existence of a large, small-scale domestic construction sector which is
likely to be significantly less well paid than is its formal sector
counterpart. This is not surprising since the two sectors may actually
be thought of as producing different outputs.
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moderate level for construction are similar to the earnings structures of
many countries, including Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and the TI.S./1
In addition to reinforcing earlier evidence on the similarity of
real wage trends throughout: the formal economy, the disaggregated inter-
industry earnings data pernit some evaluation of market efficiency. Tinder
certain assumptions, the change in relative dispersion of the interindustry
dimension of the wage structure can be used as a test of market behavior.
A narrowing of earnings dispersion is consistent, for example, with compe-
titive conditions. As firnms compete for workers and workers compete for
jobs, differentials strictly associated with sector of employment should
diminish. Analagously, an effective government wage policy aimed at, say,
the distributional objective of compressing wage differences could generate
the same observeable outcome. Of course, in either instance, other forces
will effect the dispersion of interindustry earnings. Changing skill mixes
and differential growth rates between industries can cause either greater
variance or compression in the wage structure irrespective of either compe-
titive or institutional pressures., For this reason, the simple trend in
interindustry earnings dispersion is far from a definitive measure of market
behavior.
In Table 4 a summary measure of relative dispersion, the coeffi-
cient of variation, equaling the standard deviation divided by the mean, of
monthly earnings for the eight ma:Jor industrial subsectors /2 is presented
for the years 1970-81. In the early 1970's no discernable trend is evident,
but after 1975 a steady contraction in interindustry earnings differences is
apparent. Although this contraction extends one year beyond the high growth
period 1976-1979, the results suggest a correlation between growing labor
demand and wage competition. During this period it is difficult to identify
a dominant institutional force which could account for so noticeable a
compression in the interindustry wrage structure. Competition between firms
in different sectors for scarce workers does emerge as a likely explanation
for the observed trend./3
/1 See ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics (1981).
/2 Manufacturing, Commerce, Construction, Electricity, Finance, Mining,
Personal Services, Transportation.
/3 Evidence on the mobility of Korean workers lends additional support to
the interpretation. Ba:L (1977), using sample survey date on 1,115
workers, found that 54.2% of the sample had changed jobs at least once.
Other evidence, cited below in the discussion of permanent employment,
also supports the view that worker mobility between firms exists. Such
mobility is a necessary condition for a competitive explanation of the
observed compression in the interindustry earnings structure.
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Table 4: INTERINDUSTRY EARNINGS STRUICTURE - THFE TREND IN
RELATIVE DISPERSION
Year Coefficient of Variation /a
1970 .357
1971 .386
1972 .373
1973 .388
1974 .357
1975 .391
1976 .380
1977 .320
1978 .313
1979 .259
1980 .212
1981 .231
/a Coefficient of variation equals the stand-
ard deviation divided by the mean of month-
ly earnings for 8 industrial subsectors.
The lack of systematic narrowing of earnings differentials in the
early 1970's and the reversal of trend in 1Q81 may suggest that during rela-
tively slack periods wage competition between workers is not an effective
mechanism for reducing interindustry wage differences. Wage setting during
these periods may be relatively more responsive to firm and worker specific
situations than to competitive forces.
A final issue which the interindustry earnings series can be used
to address, concerns the pattern of wage setting and its potential role as a
source of wage push in domestic price inflation. The relationship between
annual nominal wage increases in one industry or sector and how they "spill-
over" into other industries and sectors has been raised in both the micro
and macroeconomic literature. In the O.E.C.D. nations the notion of wage
rounds or pattern bargaining, argues that wage outcomes in certain key
industries or large firms form the basis for wage determination elsewhere
in the economy. On a behavioral plane, the objective of workers, at least
implicitly, is to maintain relative earnings. When applied to developing
nations, this concept has been referred to as "wage leadership," where the
wage leader is usually the public sector, a major trade union or multi-
national enterprise. Whatever label is attached to the theory, the basic
notion remains the same--institutional forces empower workers in the wage-
following sectors to raise their compensation above what purely market
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forces would produce. The system biecomes a de facto version of an admin-
istered price of labor. If the wagie leadership model holds up, the entire
protected sector realizes wage gains above what productivity criteria might
dictate and a wage-price spiral may follow.
Although this theory has Ibeen voiced since the 1950's when major
U.S. industrial collective bargaining settlements, in such industries as
automobiles and steel, were seen as setting off wage rounds affecting other
industries, the theory has not been rigorously tested at either a micro-
economic or macroeconomic level. Conditions for when wage leadership exists,
or for when a pattern of interindus try wage settlements reflects wage
leadership, are not well defined. (;iven the limitations of the received
theory, it is difficult to assess the role selected sectors in the Vorean
economy may have played in influencing wage levels throughout the formal
economy.
The existence of neither a strong union movement, nor of rigid
government wage guidelines, nor of a dominant foreign enterprise sector makes
the Korean labor market an unlikely candidate for wage leadership to apply.
Nonetheless the benchmark or reference wage effect of certain settlements
may be significant. For example, government wage increases are determined
annually and are publicized, and may exert a guideline effect on wage
setting elsewhere in the formal economy. To explore this possibility and
since wage leadership refers to nomLnal events, Table 5 presents the average
annual percentage increase in earnings for manufacturing, nonmanufacturing
and the government./1 The government figure is not the realized average
increase, rather it is a statement of the government's wage target and does
not take into consideration promotions or any changes in the skill mix of
public employment. As such, the target as an estimate of average public
sector wage increases is likely to be biased downward relative to the
percentages reported for the private formal economy.
/1 Recall that in 1981 government employed almost 900,000 workers repre-
senting 18% of total public plus private formal economy employment. Its
potential influence, based on sLze alone, could be considerable. If one
breaks down public employment by skill classes it is likely that the
government employs even larger percentages of higher level skills and
is, therefore, even more influential in these submarkets.
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Table 5: AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN TOTAL EARNING.S
(1) (2) (3)
Year Manufacturing Nonmanufacturing Covernment
1971 16.2 16.8 14
1972 13.9 21.3 19
1973 18.0 8.6 24
1974 35.3 29.5 48
1975 27.0 32.9 28
1976 34.7 42.9 55
1977 33.8 29.0 25
1978 34.3 36.5 26
1979 28.6 24.3 23
1980 22.7 21.2 22
1981 20.1 21.4 10
Sources: (1) & (2) Monthly Wage Survey
(3) EPB
If one considers the data of Table 5 or the accompanying graph,
Figure III, no obvious pattern of correlation describes the interaction of
public and private earnings. Public sector increases steadily rose through-
out the early 1970's, leveled off during 1977-1980 and fell in 1981. (Note
that this decline is scheduled to continue for at least another year. The
announced 1982 target is an average Q% increase.) From 1Q72 through 1976
the public sector, in an attempt to "catch-up" to compensation levels pre-
vailing elsewhere, rapidly increased civil servant salaries. During the
high growth years, 1976-1979, public sector increases started to lag behind
the private economy. Since the downturn in economic activity, lower public
sector salary increases have been mandated due to both fiscal pressures and
the government's desire to set an example as part of an "implicit" wage
guideline policy.
The data do not readily support the view that the government has
been a wage leader. The correspondence of same year wage increases between
sectors is low and no obvious lag pattern emerges upon inspecting the trends.
This does not deny that increases granted by the government are going to
serve as a signal elsewhere in the economy. However other forces, including
market pressures, appear likely to heavily influence private wage settle-
ments. If wage push explanations are at the root of the Korean price infla-
tion of the late 70s, an alternative to public sector wage leadership as
the causal mechanism must be found.
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A summary of the empirical findings on the interindustry earnings
structure follows:
(a) Similar real earnings trends across economic subsectors from
1970-1981;
(b) Stability in the ranking of interindustry earnings coupled with
secular compression in the structure, especially during the late
1970s; and
(c) Lack of simple correspondence between public and private wage
increases throughout the 1970s.
These findings suggest some responsiveness of industry earnings to
macroeconomic events and the potential allocative efficiency of the wage
setting system. Furthermore, the role of public sector pay determination
is, at best, an influence on private wage setting but does not appear to
have acted as a binding wage guideline.
C. "Demographic" Dimensions of the Wage Structure
An account of the interindustry earnings structure provides a use-
ful starting point for evaluating the trends and their implications in the
formal economy wage structure. However, the interindustry dimensions pro-
vides a restricted view of wage dynamics because its boundaries are somewhat
arbitrary. Afterall, we do not believe that specific labor markets are
defined by industrial classifications. The mobility of Korean workers and
the absence of industry unions supports this view. By focusing on personal
characteristics of workers, such as sex, education and experience, it is
possible to identify specific labor markets which are more clearly deli-
neated. By analyzing the movements in wage differentials between such
groups, the allocative properties of the labor market can be further
assessed. The response of the labor market to the relative scarcity of
different types of labor should reflect the market signaling properties of
wage outcomes.
Relative to other economies, there are few obvious categories of
noncompeting groups within the Korean labor market. Neither ethnic nor
regional differences produce significant segmentation. Men and women,
however, may represent noncompeting groups both in terms of earnings
determination and educational and occupational opportunities. The tendency
for women to leave the work force at marriage plus characteristics of Korean
sociology warrant separate treatment of male and female labor market experi-
ence. Wherever possible in our analysis of the wage structure we will dis-
tinguish workers according to their sex.
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Sex Differentials
We proceed by examining the trend in relative wages between men
and women. The relevant nominal earnings data appear in the Annex.1 I
Table 6 below presents the derived male/female wage ratios for specific
education cohorts.
Table 6- MALE/FEMALE EARNINGS RATIO BY EDUCATION (1971-1981)
Educational Attainment
College &
Year All Workers University /a High School Middle & Primary
1971 2.31 1.39 1.53 2.10
1972 2.22 1.28 1.50 1.94
1973 2.21 1.41 1.56 1.88
1974 1.95 1.60 1.56 1.87
1975 2.36 1.66 1.63 1.90
1976 2.28 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1977 2.28 1.62 1.74 1.77
1978 2.30 1.80 1.76 1.87
1979 2.36 1.91 1.80 1.98
1980 2.33 1.73 1.82 1.97
1981 2.25 1.64 1.76 1.93
mean 2.26 1.60 1.67 1.92
(s.d.) (.114) (.195) (.122) (0.87)
/a Includes Junior College, College and University Graduates.
Source: See Annex Table A2.
/1 These data were obtained from the ten year collection, 1971-81, of pub-
lished results from the Occupational Wage Survey. (The first survey was
undertaken in 1970 but these ;results are so out-of-line with later
figures that they were not included in this analysis.) Both the Occupa-
tional and Monthly Wage Surveys rely on almost identical samples of
establishments. Major revisions in the list of establishments from
which this sample was drawn were undertaken in 1973, 1976 and 1980. As
a result some discontinuous "leaps" can be expected surrounding these
years. However, it is expected that employment rather than earnings
data were more affected by these sampling changes. For the Monthly Wage
Survey, an ex-post smoothing of data trends was undertaken, therefore,
previous results cited from the MWS, all of which rely on only the
latest publication of that survey, are not as seriously affected by the
sampling change as may be the OWS results.
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Male earnings in the private formal economy averaged 2.26 times
female earnings from 1971-81./l Furthermore, this differential shows no
secular trend over the 11 year period. Not even during the high growth peri-
od, 1976-79, was there a particularly distinct pattern of change. This is a
somewhat surprising result, since the considerable demand pressures of those
years, reflected in rapidly growing real wages, might have been expected to
lower prevailing differentials as firms substituted lower priced female
workers for relatively more expensive male labor.
To further test this substitution hypothesis a more disaggregated
view of the male/female wage structure is of value. After all, during the
entire 11 year period, significant changes in the skill mix of industrial
employment occurred. Therefore, the aggregate trend in the male/female
earnings ratio may mask the true direction of relative wage adjustments.
OWS estimates indicate that the Korean labor force was becoming more female
and more education intensive during the 1970s. In the 11 years under
consideration women increased their share of industrial employment from
31.9% to 38.5%./2 Among all workers, those with more than middle school
education grew from 34.8% of total formal employment in 1971 to 43.8% in
1981. Educated women, those with more than middle school, increased their
share of total female employment from 17.5% to 28.5% during this period
while the corresponding figures for educated men were 43.0% and 53.5% res-
pectively. These changes in the education/sex mix of industrial employment
legitimate the need for a more disaggregated inspection of the sex dimension
of the wage structure.
In Table 6, male/female earnings ratios by level of educational
attainment indicate that, on average sex differentials decline as education
level rises. Looking within education groups, over the entire period for
college and high school graduates the premium accruing to men shows a
gradual increase. In all cases the high growth years are associated with
widening sex differentials and only for the most educated have these
differences narrowed appreciably during the recent, post-1979, economic
slump.
Since education is only one attribute which contributes to worker
productivity, it would be incorrect to assume that all skill differences
between the sexes have been captured by the education disaggregation. Job
experience in particular is vastly different for men and women due to sex
/1 By way of comparison, in Japan in 1955 the male/female earnings differ-
ential equaled 2.25. By 1965 it had fallen to 2.09 and by 1975 to 1.79.
(Source: Cook and Ylayashi (1980) ).
/2 By way of comparison, the corresponding percentages of female employment
in Japan's industrial sector are 28.7% (1960), 3103% (1970) and 31.2%
(1978). (Source: Cook and Hayashi (1980)).
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related patterns of labor force participation. Nonetheless, the results
suggest that wage competition between men and women was not strong enough
to compress earnings disparities. It should also be noted that during periods
of peak demand, male earnings growth outpaced female pay increases, while
female employment grew at a faster rate than did the increase in jobs
filled by men. By implication, the elasticity of labor supply is greater
for women than for men, a not uncommon result.
The inability of the female labor market, with its lower reser-
vation wages, to dampen male wage increases for even the lowest education
groups suggests a low elasticity of substitution of women for men which may
produce allocative inefficiencies. Since the Korean labor market exhibits
both industrial and occupat:ional segmentation by sex -- there are, in essence,
male industries and female industries, male occupations and female
occupations -- it may be the case that Korean institutions and not market
forces may limit the role t:hat women, as a significant percentage of the
working age population, can contribute to the growth process. By not more
fully integrating women into the formal labor market -- either by removing
sex related job barriers or by offering better wages as incentives -- Korea
may maintain an industrial cost structure containing distortions which could
be removed. Although the entire fabric of Korean culture and society is
woven into this problem, government initiatives within, say, greater equality
of opportunities in public employnent or through other policy directives
could augment the efficiency of the industrial labor market. Tne redis-
tributive impact of such policies might also be considered beneficial.
Education Differentials
In an efficiently operating labor market various forces will act
to either expand or contract the educational wage structure. The relative
scarcity of different types of workers should determine relative wage
movements. On the supply side, lagged population growth and the capacity
of the schooling system are likely to be key determinants. On the demand
side, differential rates of indust:rial expansion and ease of substitution
between education groups will influence wage outcomes.
Korean macroeconomic trends are consistent with an increasing
demand for labor throughout the 1970so The 1980s have been associated with
far slower expansion, if not negat:ive employment growth. On the supply
side, stocks of educated workers grew over the entire time period with
college trained and high school graduates becoming increasingly less
scarce. By 1982, concern over the unemployment of educated youth was being
voiced. This represents a significant reversal from the late 1970s when
firms complained about the difficulty of finding trained labor.
With these trends in mind, we turn to the available data which
permit calculation of earnings ratios between the following groups: college
and university; junior college; high school; and, middle plus primary school
graduates. The data, reported in Table 7, suggest a nmber of trends. For
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both men and women, the largest of the three differntials is College/High
School, averaging to an 88% and 93% premium for College educated men and
women respectively./l If productivity factors are responsible for these
earnings ratios, then it can be concluded that post-secondary school
education has been the most productivity augmenting form of education over
the last decade. If institutional explanations, such as credentialism,
account for at least some of the observed differentials then a strict
productivity explanation needs to be modified.
Table 7: EARNINGS RATIOS FOR MEN AND WOMEN BY EDUCATION (1971-1981)
Men Women
College//a High College//a High
junior College//b school/ junior College//b school/
Year college high school middle /c college high school middle /c
1971 n.a. 1.68 1.44 n.a. 1.85 1.99
1972 n.a. 1.74 1.45 n.a. 2.08 1.84
1973 n.a. 1.76 1.48 n.a. 1.94 1.79
1974 1.42 1.81 1.40 1.33 1.76 1.68
1975 1.53 1.90 1.46 1.39 1.87 1.71
1976 1.51 n.a. n.a. 1.60 n.a. n.a.
1977 1.48 1.95 1.44 1.72 2.08 1.47
1978 1.48 1.95 1.42 1.47 1.90 1.51
1979 1.50 1.95 1.31 1.36 1.84 1.44
1980 1.51 1.90 1.27 1.39 1.99 1.38
1981 1.51 1.88 1.28 1.45 2.02 1.40
/a College and university graduates.
/b Junior college, college and university graduates.
/c Middle and Primary School Graduates.
Source: See Annex Tables Al and A2.
The trend in education differentials for men suggests the following.
From 1971-1978 the High School/Middle School ratio remained relatively
constant. After 1978, steady declines in the ratio are consistent with the
/1 Park (1981) arrived at a similar conclusion based on cross-section
estimation of human capital earnings functions. For both the men and
women in his 1976 sample survey, the economic return to College and
University education was incrementally higher than for any other
level of completed schooling.
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declining scarcity of High School graduates as Korea approached universal
secondary education. Additionally, the unskilled nature of many of Korea's
industrial jobs suggests that a high degree of substitution should exist
between these two education group. The College/High School ratio shows a
markedly different pattern. Widening differentials generally characterize
the years 1971-1977, followed by 2 years of constant relative earnings and
then 2 years of a declining earnings ratio. The increasing demand for
educated workers in the early 197Os met with scarcities in the available
stocks of such workers. By the latte 70s, however, supplies had increased
and the stability of the College/High School differential during the post-1975
boom argues for a significant turnaround in the relative scarcity of
college educated men. The decline in their relative earnings since 1979
further supports this view. The College/Junior College trend is quite
stable, varying little more than a percent or two since 1975. The stability
of the differential suggests that the substitutability of these workers as
well as the relative growth in their demand and supply have remained
essentially constant.
In the female labor market, Migh School/Middle School differentials
eroded even more quickly than did the male trend. As with the men, the
fact that the trend exhibits no cyclical behavior may indicate that
relative scarcities of these types of labor progressively diminished. The
experience of college educated women exhibits no generalizeable pattern
suggesting that the wage dynamics of this labor submarket are more
complicated, and, perhaps, far more institutionally affected, than they are
for their male counterparts. Given the relatively small percentage that
college educated women represent out of total formal employment, the
efficiency implications of these wage trends are not likely to be of major
significance. The College/Junior College trend also shows rather erratic
movements which do not lend t:hemselves to any straight forward
interpretation.
For major employment categories, the lower levels of educational
attainment for men and women, and fDr higher educated men, earnings
differentials appear to track relative scarcities. The role of
institutional forces, be they the results of internal wage structures or
government wage policy, may also account for the observed trends. However,
the dynamic adjustments which have been documented suggests that if
institutional forces are a major determinant of these wage trends, then
institutions must have flexible objectives. If not, greater wage rigidities
would be expected. If institutionaL forces exhibit such flexibility then
the distinction between institutions and market behavior
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becomes blurred. For these reasons a market oriented system of wage deter-
mination appears as a reasonable description for most of the education
dimension of the Korean labor market./l
The long run as well as cyclical pattern of earnings differentials
by education serve as a useful backdrop for assessing recent changes in the
Government's implicit system of wage guidelines. For the last few years
the Government has suggested that firms compress internal wage structures.
This policy, oriented toward distributional objectives, might be considered
to have been achieved based on the evidence assembled in Table 7. However,
the initial narrowing of education differentials predates the Government's
stated commitment to this objective and argues that market forces may-be
primarily responsible. At a minimum, market forces and Government policies
appear to be working in tandem. In the future, the Government should be
wary of imposing wage guidelines which act to further accelerate the
compression of the wage structure. Although laudable on equity grounds,
such policies may produce improper market signals, encouraging firms to
substitute educated (i.e., relatively less expensive) for uneducated (i.e.,
relatively more expensive) workers. Such disemployment effects, if they
occur, would run counter to the initial distributional objectives of the
stated policy.
The contribution public policy versus market forces has made to
recent trends is something that even sophisticated wage analysis would be
unable to accurately separate. What can be concluded is that the forces of
labor supply and demand have exerted a significant impact on the rewards
that education returns to those in the labor force. In the most recent
period these rewards have been falling, suggesting slack in the labor
market for educated workers, a situation distinct from conditions of the
late 1970s.
/1 One other potentially important institutional factor should also be
raised. As has been argued in other nations, a system of job
filtering may occur whereby education becomes a necessary, although
on productivity grounds unwarranted, criteria for employment. Under
such a system, observed wage differentials by education erode, because
the average wage of the educated falls as workers with education start
accepting lower paid positions. Such outcomes may be consistent with
efficient wage determination but reflect considerable inefficiencies
in the use of resources devoted to education. The social costs of
education under this scenario diverge from the private returns. Lacking
any evidence, we cannot even speculate on the presence or extent of job
filtering in the Korean labor market.
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Experience Differentials
In addition to education, job experience is a prime determinant
of individual earnings. As workers accumulate more experience their
earnings tend to rise, although this increase usually occurs at a decreasing
rate. The productivity explanation of this trend is straightforward.
Learning-by-doing increases the quantity and quality of output a worker
produces and employers reward this higher productivity with a higher level
of compensation. Human capital theory enriches this explanation by
interpreting the time and resources devoted to on-the-job training as
investments which bear a positive return at some later date. An earnings
experience profile can then be derived which exhibits properties which are
generally substantiated by empirical information. The human capital theory,
with its distinction between specific and general human capital, also leads
to additional hypothesis concerning the relative shapes of earnings
experience profiles for various education and occupation cohorts. Lastly,
the institution of seniority systenms, which may not mesh with productivity
trends, can also account for the observed relationship between annual
earnings and a worker's years of job or career experience.
In Korea, experience is certainly rewarded. The OWS reports
earnings by years of career experience by occupation. Note that such data
do not pertain to any one individual. Therefore, in addition to the usual
bias inherent in cross-section studies, if workers change occupations,
their own earnings profiles will differ from those generated by this
aggregate analysis. Based oln the OWS data, the accompanying Figure
presents, for 1980, the earnings experience profiles for six, relatively
well-defined occupations. For each profile 4 data points are available:
mean earnings for less than 1 year of experience, 1 - 4 years, 5 - 9 years
and 10 or more years./l Every occupation exhibits earnings as an increasing
function of experience. A flattening of the profile, consistent with the
accepted semi-logarithmic specification of earnings as a function of
experience and experience squared, is not apparent, perhaps due to the
limited amount of information available. Given the youthful nature of the
Korean industrial labor force, even the greater than 10 years of experience
category will not contain sufficient numbers of older employees to force the
cohort average to decline from its earlier trend.
The relative slopes of the profiles are somewhat consistent with
expectations, since they appear to vary positively with the level of
earnings in a given occupation. This may suggest either (or both) a
greater tendency or greater opportunities to invest in productivity
/1 In Figure IV, earnings were plotted at the midpoint of the first three
experience intervals: 0.5, 2.5 and 7 years. For the open-ended
category, earnings were plotted at 15 years of experience.
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Expwience Earnings Profiles By Occpaton (198)
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augmenting human capital at more sophisticated occupations. Note that the
production supervisor and general foreman category is not consistent with
this trend.
With these profiles as background, the responsiveness of earnings
to experience due to macroeconomic events can be considered. For the six
occupations depicted in the preceding Figure, Table 8 provides estimates
of how the returns to experience have varied over time. For each
occupation, the ratio of earnings; in the <1, 1 - 4 and 5 - 9 experience
intervals to earnings in the >10 interval is presented for 1975, '78 and
'80. Focussing only on the experience of new entrants, there is evidence of
general tightening (e.g., spinners, etc.), widening (e.g., engineers, etc.)
and variability (e.g., production, etc.) in experience differentials over
time. Based only on this sample no single trend is apparent, suggesting that
varying market and institutional conditions affect each occupational labor
market.
This lack of a consistent trend is somewhat surprising, especially
for 1978. Given the strength of labor demand in that year, it might have
been expected that experienced workers would have emerged as especially
scarce. A widening of differentials should have then emerged. Although we
cannot account for why this did not occur, we can consider one possible
explanation. If internal wage structures rather than market forces dominate
occupational wage determination, then rigidities in the changing of relative
wages may operate. Although quantitative standards for when wage rigidity
is in evidence are not available, the data of Table 8 show large relative
wage changes over only 2- and 3-year intervals, i.e., compare, say, 1975 to
1978 earnings experience ratios for any given occupation. Such evidence
does not appear consistent with internal wage structures as the explanation
of the trend in experience differentials over the business cycle./I
/1 Note that this is not a good test for the existence of internal wage
structures since the data are not firm specific. Inter- as well as
intra-firm changes plus differences due to occupational mobility will
contribute to the observed variance in earnings by experience.
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Table 8- EARNINGS EXPERIENCE RATIOS BY SELECTED
OCCUPATIONS FOR SELECTED YEARS /a
Years of experience
<1 1 - 4 5 - 9 >10
Engineers, architects and related
technicians
1975 .61 .77 .94 1.00
1978 .53 .68 .82 1.00
1980 .56 .66 .84 1.00
Production supervisors and general
foremen
1975 .63 .73 .85 1.00
1978 .68 .82 .96 1.00
1980 .77 .79 .93 1.00
Clerical and related workers
1975 .53 .64 .85 1.00
1978 .47 .59 .78 1.00
1980 .54 .64 .83 1.00
Machinery fitters
1975 .32 .48 .73 1.00
1978 .40 .60 .87 1.00
1980 .43 .56 .88 1.00
Production and related workers
1975 .32 .43 .71 1.00
1978 .27 .36 .79 1.00
1980 .40 .51 .68 1.00
Spinners, weavers, knitters, dyers
and related workers
1975 .34 .49 .67 1.00
1978 .40 .51 .70 1.00
1980 .44 .52 .70 1.00
/a The earnings ratio compare earnings of each experience level to earnings
in the > 10 years of experience category.
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D. The Earnings Structure According to Characteristics of the Firm
Earnings Differentials by Size of: Firm
In a competitive labor market, characteristics of the firm such
as size or type of ownership should not affect the compensation received by
workers, assuming that these workers are identical in all other respects.
This competitive condition is rarely met and the existence and persistence
of wage differentials by firm size is one of the most robust results of
wage structure analyses undertaken in both developed and developing nations.
Explanations for this differential vary. Competitive theorists argue that
both training and hiring costs produce the differential while bargaining
theorists cite the consequences of some form of bilateral monopoly. Dual
labor market theories often point to firm size as a critical boundary
segmenting primary and secondary labor markets.
Turning to the Korean data, the evidence reported in Table 9,
conforms with results from other nations. For almost every year average
earnings in manufacturing monotonically increase with firm size. However,
since these data are not standardized by skill mix - that is, they do not
pertain to identical workers - some of the observed differentials will be
due to the presumed increasing skill intensity of larger establishments./I
Given our interest in the efficiency of the Korean labor market,
the trend in wage differentials by firm size is of more value than the
intra-year findings. The last column of Table 9 illustrates the
compression in the earnings structure by firm size. Again, relying on the
coefficient of variation as an index of relative dispersion, note that from
1970-1980 inter-firm size differentials declined. The trend has almost
monotonically narrowed with relat:ive dispersion falling by 66% over the
decade. Cyclical responses, which have been evident in some of the other
dimensions of the wage structure, are not readily apparent in this instance.
At best, peak growth years have accelerated the rate of compression in firm
size wage differentials; at worst., these years have not deviated from the
longer run trend.
/1 If one estimates an interindustry earnings function for a given year,
where industry earnings are regressed on capital and skill intensity
as well as firm size, firm size, ceterus paribus, is significant and
positively related to earnings. See Lindauer (1979).
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Table 9: EARNINGS BY FIRM SIZE (1970-80)
Index of
Number of employees relative
5-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 100-199 200-299 300-499 >500 dispersion/b
1970 91 110 117 153 162 n.a. 170/a 203 0.273
1971 113 128 144 181 188 n.a. 205/a 234 0.256
1972 121 154 173 202 221 n.a. 243/a 253 0.248
1973 166 204 219 251 263 276 264 305 0.183
1974 206 254 280 317 331 339 381 390 0.201
1975 274 332 365 412 441 427 470 526 0.197
1976 344 425 468 524 538 584 585 672 0.199
1977 476 566 627 683 683 717 791 871 0.183
1978 680 814 885 947 962 1,000 1,075 1,191 0.166
1979 950 1,111 1,214 1,292 1,333 1,298 1,448 1,516 0.142
1980 1,108 1,361 1,478 1,573 1,620 1,689 1,755 1,942 0.163
/a Includes 200-499.
/b Equals the standard deviation of earnings by firm size divided by the mean.
Source: Major Statistics of Small and Medium Industries, derived from Mining
and Manufacturing Surveys.
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The two ratios tend to converge in the late 1070s. Prior to 1975, a high
relative earnings/relative productivity gap existed, implying that small
firms were likely to have suffered from a significant cost disadvantage.
Note that during this period employment in the small-scale sector declined
in both absolute and relative terms. The renewed health of the small-scale
sector since the mid-70s, however, is associated with sharp increases in
labor productivity.
Table 12: RATIOS OF EARNINGS AND PRODUCTIVITY FOR SMIs
AND LARGE INDUJSTRIES (1970-79)
Year Earnings ratio Productivity ratio
1970 65.3 53.1
1971 67.4 48.5
1972 71.2 47.4
1973 76.9 43.6
1974 75.5 43.2
1975 76.2 63.R
1976 75.3 69.9
1977 76.5 81.7
1978 78.4 75.0
1979 77.6 77.9
/a SMIs are small and medium industries encompassing firms
of fewer than 300 employees. Large industries refer to
manufacturing establishments employing 300 or more workers.
Source: Derived from Mining and Manufacturing Survey Data.
Regional Wage Differentials /1
Since Korea is both a relatively small nation and one which is
known to be ethnically homogenous, persistent regional wage differences are
not anticipated on noneconomic grounds. However, regional disparities due
to economic factors cannot be similarly discounted. Most Korean industrial
/1 Although location is as much a characteristic of individuals as it is
of firms, the regional dimension of the wage structure is treated in
this section on firm characteristics because, at least in the short
run, firms are probably relatively less mobile than workers.
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In analyzing the movement of these wage changes, it is worth
repeating that firm size differentials embody differences attributable to
skill mix. Whereas this poses a problem for interpreting cross-section
differences, for analyzing time trends, nonstandardization by skill mix
probably biases the results in a conservative direction. For differences
in the skill mix to account for the secular compression in relative
dispersion, small firms would have to become increasingly skill intensive
relative to large firms. Although the data are not readily available to
refute this hypothesis, knowledge of Korean development during the 1970s
suggests that such an outcome is improbable.
A more disaggregated view of the time trend in wage differentials
by firm size is provided by Park Fun-Koo (1981). IJsing OWS data, Park
demonstrates that throughout the 1970s, wage differentials by firm size
were reduced for both men and women, and for both production and adminis-
trative personnel. Park's results are reproduced as Table 1 below. The
inter-skill mix dimension of Park's work suggests that for any given year
white collar occupations experience the greatest differential by firm size.
This result is expected since the level of skill and responsibility required
of administrative workers increases with firm size.
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Table 10: EARNINGS BY FIRM SIZE BY SEX AND OCCTJPATION, SELECTED YEARS
1973 1975 1977 1979 1980
Men
10 - 29 72.5 72.? A1.1 83.8
30 - 99 - 83.2 8A.9 84.7 87.3
100 - 499 - 89.4 92.8 q1.6 95.7
>500 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 1o0.n
Women
10 - 29 - 91.5 99.7 105.8 103.1
30 - 99 -- 99.9 103.9 106.8 102.1
100 - 499 - 87.5 91.9 95.2 97.1
>500 -- 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Administrators
10 - 29 -- 54.9 66.1 79.8 63.8
30 - 99 - 70.0 80.0 83.9 73.8
100 - 499 - 87.7 87.1 95.5 84.0
>500 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Production workers
10 - 29 66.8 76.0 83.3 84.2 89.8
30 - 99 82.0 7Q.8 87.8 89.2 86.2
100 - 499 951.8 88.3 84.4 100.0 97.3
>500 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Park (1981).
The empirical findings presented above indicate that differentials
by firm size have eroded over time. These results are consistent with a
market environment in which firms are forced to compete for workers. As an
additional question it would be useful to know what impact this wage com-
petition has had on small firms. Has labor market efficiency been achieved
at the price of losing the small-scale sector?
In Table 11 the number of workers and their relative share of
total manufacturing employment by firm size are presented for selected
years. From 1971 to 1975 employment in the smallest firms (5-19) fell in
both absolute and relative terms. Given that this was a period of total
employment growth, the decline is even more substantial. If the small-scale
sector is more broadly defined to include employment in all firms with
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fewer than 200 employees, 1971-75 remains a period of declining employment
while post-1975 experience shows considerable growth in absolute employment
levels and some increase in relative shares. What these results imply is
that wage competition during the latter 1970s did not crowd out smaller
establishments. In an indirect way this supports an aspect of the
efficient labor market hypothesis. If institutional arrangements forced
small firms to accept the high wages of large scale establishment, then the
continued demise of the small-scale sector would be expected. After all,
the competitiveness of their product markets would leave little room for
paying excessive wages. The viability of the small enterprise sector,
therefore, argues against this interpretation.
Table il: DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYMENT BY FIRM SIZE
FOR SELECTED YEARS
Number of employees
Year 5-19 20-49 50-99 1oo-199 >200
1971 149/a 87 68 87 456
(17.637b (10.3) (8.0) (10.3) (53.8)
1975 132 115 124 163 8R6
(9.3) (8.1) (8.7) (11.5) (62.4)
1977 145 165 170 242 1,197
(7.5) (8.6) (8.9) (12.6) (62.4)
1979 170 205 205 256 1,281
(8.0) (9.7) (q.7) (12.1) (6n.5)
1980 166 204 207 251 1,187
(8.2) (10.1) (1n.3) (12.0) (5R.q)
/a In thousands of workers.
In order to maintain a market interpretation of the erosion of
earnings differences by firm size, productivity differentials should be
correlated with earnings differentials. If small firms had only experienced
relative wage growth without complementary productivity growth then the
demise of the small-scale sector would again be predicted. For two firm
size categories - small and medium industries (SMIs) with employment of less
than 300, and large industries employing more than 300 - Table 12 presents
the ratios of earnings and productivity measures over the 1970s.
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The two ratios tend to converge in the late 1970s. Prior to 1975, a high
relative earnings/relative productivity gap existed, implying that small
firms were likely to have suffered from a significant cost disadvantage.
Note that during this period employment in the small-scale sector declined
in both absolute and relative terms. The renewed health of the small-scale
sector since the mid-70s, however, is associated with sharp increases in
labor productivity.
Table 12: RATIOS OF EASNINGS AND PRODUCTIVITY FOR SMIs
AND LARGE INDUSTRIES (1970-79)
Year Earnings ratio Productivity ratio
1970 65.3 53.1
1971 67.4 48.5
1972 71.2 47.4
1973 76.9 43.6
1974 75.5 43.2
1975 76.2 63.8
1976 75.3 69.9
1977 76.5 81.7
1978 78.4 75.0
1979 77.6 77.5
/a SMIs are small and medium industries encompassing firms
of fewer than 300 employees. Large industries refer to
manufacturing establishments employing 300 or more workers.
Source: Derived from Mining and Manufacturing Survey Data.
Regional Wage Differentials /1
Since Korea is both a relatively small nation and one which is
known to be ethnically homogenous, persistent regional wage differences are
not anticipated on noneconomic grounds. However, regional disparities due
to economic factors cannot be similarly discounted. Most Korean industrial
/1 Although location is as much a characteristic of individuals as it is
of firms, the regional dimension of the wage structure is treated in
this section on firm character:Lstics because, at least in the short
run, firms are probably relatively less mobile than workers.
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activity is concentrated in the Seoul or Busan vicinity. In 1980, 71% of
all manufacturing employment was situated within these two cities and their
surrounding provinces. Therefore, it might be expected that labor market
circumstances and wage outcomes could vary across regions.
Compression in the regional wage structure can be construed as
another test of labor market efficiency. A secular tendency toward the
narrowing of regional wage differences is expected if competitive forces
operate. Workers seeking better wages and firms attempting to minimize
costs would be expected to help arbitrage regional wages.
The only data available to test this hypothesis come from the
Mining and Manufacturing surveys. Average annual remuneration for all
workers, and for production and administrative personnel separately, are
stratified according to 11 regional classifications and by 9 manufacturing
subsectors. As Table 13 illustrates, significant nominal regional
earnings differential have existed since 1955./I Furthermore, shifting in
the rank ordering of regional earnings has occurred with Seoul not always
in the wage leading position.
The market efficiency hypothesis predicts secular narrowing in
regional wage differentials. Choosing the coefficient of variation as an
index of earnings dispersion, the bottom line of Table 13 illustrates the
significant compression in regional earnings which has occurred throughout
the recorded period. The actual measure of dispersion employed in this
analysis is based on Korea's two "special" cities, Seoul and Busan, and on 8
of its 9 provinces. Jeju, a small island off the Korean coast accounting
for less than 0.5% of 1980 employment in manufacturing, was excluded from
the computations. As an extreme outlier it would otherwise generate
significant distortions in the variance measure.
The univariate analysis of regional wage dynamics just offered
does not, of course, account for the impact of changing regional skill
mixes. However, if the observed compression is to be explained by
differential rates of changing skill intensity across regions, then it must
/1 Nominal earnings are used because regional price indices are not
available to deflate each year to the same base. Cost-of-living
differences will, therefore, account for some, but unlikely for all,
of the observed regional variance in earnings.
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Table 13: EARNINGS BY REGION IN MANUFACTUJRING (1559-80, SELECTED YEARS)
(In current W'nno p.a.)
Region 1955 1958 1963 1967 1970 1972 1q75 1976 1978 q197 1P80
Seoul 22 30 48 93 182 256 467 599 1,064 1,408 1,76Q
Busan n.a. n.a. 40 85 161 209 408 555 971 1,279 1,570
Gyeanggi 16 24 47 102 181 236 486 625 1,106 1,448 1,787
Gangweon 15 22 39 7.2 155 187 570 519 927 1,358 1,588
Chungbug 12 16 45 915 165 222 493 563 1,006 1,261 1,658
Chungnam 10 16 31 7:2 128 189 390 504 897 1,202 1,442
Jeonbug 12 17 30 56 127 181 330 459 839 1,210 1,454
Jeonnam 12 18 35 60 113 124 360 483 898 1,230 1,624
Gyeongbug 12 18 35 70 120 169 420 534 994 1,299 1,624
Gyeongnam 16/a 21/a 28 73 165 222 545 740 1,294 1,611 2,062
Jeju 6 12 20 44 74 119 200 293 675 871 1,083
Nat'l. ave. 15 24 40 82 160 217 459 588 1,052 1,380 1,723
Relative dis-
persion/b .257 .228 .1Q0 .198 .170 .176 .176 .146 .131 .097 .109
/a Includes Busan.
7b The standard deviation divided by the mean of regional earnings excluding
Jeju province. See text for explanation.
Source: Mining and Manufacturing 'Surveys.
be the case that formerly low-wage areas evolve into skill-rich regions - an
unlikely form of spatial development./I
Along with the results on earnings by firm size, the findings on
regional differentials provide evidence of wage dynamics consistent with
both competition and labor market efficiency. A continued long run
narrowing of these differentials can be expected, although in the short run,
/1 Furthermore, Lindauer (1983) presents econometric evidence that regional
differentials decline over time after proxies for skill mix have been
held constant. In thai: study, an interindustry, interregion earnings
function is estimated for individual years. Capital intensity, size
distribution of firms as well as the white/blue collar and sex mix are
included as independent variables along with region specific dummy
variables. The results confirm the evidence cited above, namely that
the variance in regional earnings in Korea has diminished over time.
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based on evidence for 1980, a small widening may occur as competition
between firms for workers diminishes. It appears that competition between
workers for jobs does not produce the same type of wage adjustments as does
competition between firms for workers. In periods of slack labor demand,
some firms, having the capacity to do so, may attempt to "hoard" experienced
workers in anticipation of a cyclical upswing. Widening earnings
differentials across a number of dimensions of the wage structure in 1980,
may reflect such practices. However, it should be emphasized, based on past
experience, that such deviations from the long run trend tend to be both
small and short-lived.
Public/Private Sector Wage Differentials
A comparison of public and private compensation has already been
encountered in the earlier discussion of interindustry wage trends. It was
noted that public and private sector wage increases were not well
correlated over the 1970s. In this section a cross-sectional view will be
adopted. Of interest is whether a wedge exists between the pay received by
public versus private employees in similar occupations. If such wedges do
exist, then an inefficiency in the labor market may result. If, for
example, civil servants earn less than private sector counterparts, job
turnover and low levels of job performance may characterize public
employment. Alternatively, if the wage premium accrues to the public
employee then job queuing, nepotism and other inefficiencies associated
with "rent seeking" /1 activities may proliferate.
Wage comparisons for one year, let alone over time, for public
and private employees are not readily available for most nations. The
presumed wage taker position of public authorities has perhaps minimized
the amount of empirical research in this area. In the Yorean case, neither
the MWS nor OWS include government agencies in their sampling frames,
therefore, no comparisons can be made based on a unified data source.
What is available is a study by Park Se-Il (1981b) which relies on
OWS for data for the private sector and published civil service salary
scales for the public sector. For different occupations (e.g. starting
manager in a large firm versus 1980 Grade 3B in the civil service, i.e.
presumed entry positions of male college graduates), Park shows whether, in
1980, government workers received higher or lower total earnings than did
private employees. He further derives estimates of life-time earnings
based on expected promotion patterns. Park's general conclusions are that
public employees earn less, and that the differential increases as skill and
education levels increase. For college graduates, a private employee's entry
wages are approximately 35Q higher; for junior college graduates 30% higher-
/1 See Kreuger (1q74)
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and, for high school graduates engaged in clerical work the entry differen-
tial falls to 15%. For all education and occupation groups the differential
narrows appreciably after age 40./L[
The existence of a prival:e sector wage premium led Park to
examine the strength of demand for public sector employment. He found that
since the mid 70s the ratio of applicants to job openings has remained
relatively constant and seemingly high -- around 40 applicants/job for non-
clerical posts. Annual public sect:or turnover rates, averaging A.3% per
annum, and voluntary quit rates, 5.3%, also did not seem high by national
standards. MWS data report monthly separation rates averaging 4.5a during
the same period for employees in the private formal economy. The
relatively low turnover rates in the public sector are all the more
dramatic considering that the late 70s were a period of high wages and
labor demand in the private economy.
Park concludes that a numiber of compensating differentials most
probably account for the observed findings. Security of job tenure,
pecuniary and non-pecuniary perquisites of public office not reported in
total earnings, and a general Korean "preference" for government work help
reconcile the earnings disparities.
For our purposes, the results reinforce our skepticism over the
government's playing a wage leadership role. Furthermore, civil service
salary reform is likely to emerge in the medium term as an issue of public
sector performance not an issue of labor market wage distortion.
Union Differentials
One of the admitted purposes of trade unions is to raise wages.
If a union does so by extracting a monopoly rent either through restricting
the supply of labor or through the use of strikes or other activities which
increase production costs but not productivity, then the union's actions
can be seen as generating inefficiencies within the labor market. If,
however, unions contribute to increasing the productivity of workers or if
union power offsets the monopsony power of employers, then unions may
contribute to the efficiency of labor market outcomes. The analysis of
union wage effects and their efficiency implications occupies a large share
of contemporary labor economics research. For the T1.S., although the pre-
sence of a union wage effect is beyond dispute, its efficiency implications
have not been resolved.
/1 Park also found the following:
(i) significant intra-public sector wage differences;
(ii) compression in the public sector's own wage structure from 1978-81.
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In Korea, where union power is minimal due, in part, to
government actions which have limited the scope of bargaining units and the
use of strikes and other exhibitions of labor power, a significant union
wage effect is not anticipated. The only available evidence of union/non-
union wage differentials comes from a survey of individuals collected by
Prof. Bai of Seoul National TJniversity.
Both Bai (1977) and Park Se-Il (1981a) have analyzed the earnings
profile of the 1115 respondants to this survey. The survey, undertaken in
June 1976, reports 35.2% of the sample as members of trade unions. This is
likely to be a larger percentage than prevails in the formal economy since
the sample is biased toward larger establishments. According to Bai, trade
union members received, on average, 26% higher wages than did the non-
unionized individuals in the sample. This positive union wage effect does
not, of course, adjust for any other wage determining factor such as age,
sex, education, or experience.
Park Se-Il (1981a), using the same data, controlled for human
capital variables by regressing individual earnings on education, work
experience and a number of other firm and work specific characteristics./1
Running separate equations for men and women, Park found that a
union/non-union dummy variable was not significantly different from zero in
any specification which included human capital proxies. He, therefore,
concludes, "This suggests that unions do not, in fact, make any difference
as far as worker's earnings are concerned..."/2
E. Cross-section results on the Yorean Wage Structure
The limitation of the univariate and bivariate analysis of the
wage structure conducted thus far is its inability to simultaneously
account for the various factors which determine earnings. Therefore, when
analyzing the time trend of, say, the college/high school earnings ratio,
the interpretation must be qualified since the independent effects of
changes, for example, in worker experience and in the evolving size
distribution of firms have not been controlled for. A multivariate
analysis of earnings can overcome these limitations. Estimation of earnings
functions permits the statistical identification of the partial effect on
earnings of both worker and firm related characteristics. The
/1 These estimations will be further discussed in the proceeding section.
/2 Park Se-Il (1981a), p. 38.
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weakness of the multivariatet approach in the Korean context is the lack of
data for a sufficient number of years. Restricted, in most cases, to data
from a single year, previous studies have relied on cross-section findings
to approximate time series trends. This common approach with its
recognized form of bias is particuLarly troublesome in this context due to
the dynamic nature of the Korean economy. As such, the univariate analysis
presented above may be superior to the cross-section, multivariate studies
for understanding the evolution of the Korean wage structure.
The cross-section studies which have been undertaken complement
the findings on wage structure reported above. The available studies, most
of which have already been referrect o, include Bai's (1977) and Park Se-Il's
(1981a) work on a 1976 survey of 1115 individuals employed in registered
firms; Park Fun Koo's (1981) analysis of 1980 Occupational Wage Survey data;
and, Kim (1973) and Lindauer (1979, 1983) and their use of published
interindustry data.
These studies indicate, ceterus paribus, that education yields a
positive return to both men and womn, that work experience increases
earnings, but at a decreasing rate, that sex differentials remain after
controlling for human capital attributes and firm specific characteristics,
and that differentials by firm size manifest themselves regardless of the
permutation of wage data.
In addition to coniirming these trends, Park Se-II (1981a) finds
that it is possible to explain a larger proportion of the variance in male
than female earnings. This may suggest the greater role of institutions
and custom in female wage determination. Park also notes that employment
in enterprises with foreign involvement yields, ceterus paribus, some wage
benefit although the statistical result is only strong for women. In
Lindauer's (1979) multivariate examination of the interindustry earnings
structure, he finds that the determinants of this structure in Korea bear
considerable statistical similarity to the determinants of the rU.S.
earnings structure in manufacturing. The result implies similarities
between the nations in the outcome of the wage setting process and may
further imply similarities in the process itself.
For our purposes, the consistency of the cross-section findings
with our time trend results is what is of most importance. There are no
apparent areas of conflict which might require a reinterpretation of the
trends reported above./I
/1 It is important to note that both Park Se-Il(1981a) and Kim (1973)
interpret some of their findings as supportive of models of labor
market dualism and of "custom" as a determinant of wage setting within
the formal economy. The significance, ceterus paribus, of firm size
variables is critical to this interpretation. The interested reader is
directed to the original works for an accounting of this
interpretation.
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F. Conclusion
In any economy wage and employment outcomes are influenced by the
forces of labor supply and demand as well as by the institutional environ-
ment in which these outcomes are produced. Alternative theories of the labor
market - perfect competition, monopsony models, non-competing groups, dual
and segmented markets - vary according to the emphasis placed on how these
alternative forces influence wages and employment. The models also differ
regarding their implications for the efficiency of the labor market, its
distributional properties and the policy initiatives which should be pur-
sued. Trying to determine which of these alternative models best depicts
the Korean situation was not the primary objective of this chapter. To
attempt to have done so would have implied that empirical tests exist by
which competing hypotheses could be definitively accepted or rejected. Such
conclusive tests do not exist. Instead our main objective was to assess the
responses of Korean earnings to macroeconomic trends. By so doing we hope
to have gained some insight into the allocative properties of the labor
market and the likely path of future wage movements.
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ANNEX
Table Al: TODTAL MONTHLY EARNINGS BY SEX
AND LEVEL OF ED1JCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (1971-1981)
(In current won)
Men
All College & Junior High Middle Primary
Year workers university college school school school
1971 28,961 52,961/a n.a. 31,121 22,756 20,431
1972 29,319 55,430/a n.a. 31,780 23,415 20,360
1973 35,944 67,154/a n.a. 38,108 27,033 24,325
1974 48,490 93,535 65,960 49,020 36,568 33,172
1975 60,319 123,573 80,515 61,754 43,732 40,087
1976 82,871 172,354 114,334 81,917 57,639 52,456
1977 102,924 209,747 142,121 102,222 72,734 68,343
1978 135,089 278,539 188,656 135,650 97,443 91,853
1979 189,278 376,535 251,037 181,929 140,381 135,510
1980 222,957 425,904 282,250 210,117 164,896/b n.a.
1981 266,633 505,291 334,051 251,927 197,566/b n.a.
Women
All College & Junior High Middle Primary
Year workers university college school school school
1971 12,497 37,702 n.a. 20,363 11,393 9,584
1972 13,225 43,190 n.a. 20,763 12,167 10,754
1973 16,287 47,531 n.a. 24,503 14,427 13,139
1974 24,904 59,947 45,061 31,508 19,656 18,115
1975 25,465 77,187 55,543 37,855 22,872 21,611
1976 36,396 117,842 73,747 48,522 32,616 30,474
1977 45,199 144,085 83,988 58,900 40,843 39,283
1978 58,662 164,684 111,965 76,947 52,141 49,887
1979 80,159 205,895 151,724 101,033 70,971 69,019
1980 95,692 257,923 186,220 115,647 83,567/b n.a.
1981 118,736 329,249 226,764 143,457 102,246/b n.a.
/a Includes Junior Colleges.
/b Includes Primary School.
Source: Occupational Wage Surveys (1971-1981)
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Table A2: TOTAL MONTHLY EARNINGS BY SEX AND LEVEL
OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (1971-1981)
(In current won)
Men Women
High Middle & High Middle &
Year College School Primary College School Primary
1971 52,401 31,121 21,556 37,702 20,363 10,250
1972 55,430 31,178 21,919 43,190 20,763 11,305
1973 67,154 38,108 25,778 47,531 24,503 13,685
1974 88,961 49,020 35,111 55,525 31,508 18,732
1975 117,444 61,754 42,161 70,869 37,855 22,165
1976 n.a. 81,917 n.a. n.a. 48,522 n.a.
1977 199,158 102,222 71,013 122,734 58,900 40,073
1978 264,160 135,650 95,467 146,354 76,947 51,082
1979 354,606 181,929 138,621 185,627 101,033 70,060
1980 399,340 210,117 164,896 230,382 115,642 83,567
1981 473,905 251,927 197,566 289,121 143,457 102,246
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3. ASPECTS O]F THE WAGE PAYMENT SYSTEM
A. Introduction
The previous chapter considered the trends in Korean earnings in
the formal sector as well as the evolution of the Korean wage structure.
In this chapter, other aspects of the wage payment system will be examined.
In particular the structure of compensation will be described and the
prevalence of permanent employment systems, analagous to those in Japan,
will be reviewed. These topics provide more institutional detail on the
workings of the Korean labor market while also exposing economic issues not
revealed by the analysis of earnings alone.
B. STRUCTURE OF COMPENSATION
An element of any industrial labor relations system is the compo-
sition of total remuneration received by workers. In addition to'basic
wages, workers may receive overtime pay, annual or seasonal bonuses,
incentive payments, insurance coverage, special allowances for education
or family circumstances, and a host of other fringe benefits. Custom and
tradition, as well as economic forces, will affect not only the composition
of the compensation bundle but also the relative significance of individual
benefits. In the Korean case, the legacy of Japanese colonialism exerted
considerable influence over the wage payment system, therefore, where
appropriate, comparisons between Korea and Japan will be presented.
The most striking characteristic of Korean compensation schemes
is the relative magnitude of allowances and bonuses. In 1981, according to
the OWS, the average worker received 70% of his compenisation in basic wages.
(In this context, basic wages incLude base pay as well as cost-of-living or
family allowances or any other similar payment made on a regular monthly
basis.) The remaining 30% was roughly divided between overtime and bonus
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payments./l By comparison, in the mid-1960s, Japanese workers received
close to 77% of compensation in basic wage. The corresponding U.S. figure
would be closer to 90%./2
A finer breakdown of the Korean compensation structure is exempli-
fied in Exhibit I-a below, the breakdown of the monthly starting pay of a
college graduate working at the Bank of Tokyo in Seoul in April 1979./3
/1 A 1980 survey of over 700 establishments conducted by the Korean
Employers Federation arrived at similar figures. Basic wages amounted
to 73% of average labor payments, while bonuses, overtime and other
forms of compensation accounted for 15%, 11% and 1.7%, respectively.
Labor payments accounted for 87% of all labor costs. The remaining
percentage primarily represents severance payments, payments in-kind
and welfare costs required by law. Large firms, those employing more
than 300 workers, paid a somewhat greater percentage of compensation
in the form of nonbasic wage payments as indicated in the table below:
BONUSES AND OVERTIME PAY AS A PERCENTAGE OF
TOTAL REMUNERATION BY FIRM SIZE
Firm size Production Workers Administrators
(No. of employees) % bonus % overtime % bonus % overtime
10- 29 7.3 12.1 10.1 1.1
100-299 8.5 25.5 14.4 3.9
+ 500 13.0 24.2 20.8 6.0
/2 Kim (1973).
/3 Park (1979).
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Exhibit Ia
Monthly Total W 300,000 (100%)
Basic wage 114,486 (38.2%)
Overtime premium 103,038 (34.4%)
Transportation and
meal allowance 11,875 ( 3.9%)
Duty allowance 22,897 ( 7.6%)
Bonus 47,704 (15.9%)
Source: Park (197'3)
Exhibit I-b
I. Monthly payments
1. Basic payment
2. Allowances
a. Living allowance /1
b. Encouragement allowance /2
c. Other allowances /3
II. Annual special payments (bonuses)
III. Statutory fringe benefits
IV. Nonstatutory fringe benefits
1 Includes allowances reflecting different cost of living of each employee
such as dependent allowance, housing allowance, and locality allowance.
/2 Includes allowances such as overtime, holiday work, night shift, skill,
position, and special assignment.
/3 Education allowance, continuous service allowance, etc.
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In this instance, basic wages amount to less than 40% of total monthly pay-
ments, however, some of the overtime premium is likely to be guaranteed and
as such, may really reflect basic and not overtime pay. A more general
disaggregation of Korean compensation, discussed by both Kim (1973) and Park
(1980) appears in Exhiboit I-b. The various categories of nonbasic wage
payments can be appreciated in this depiction of the compensation package.
The Korean allowance and overtime systems have much in common with
the fringe benefit and overtime pay systems of other nations. Allowances
cover everything from housing to transportation. Korean firms may employ
more of these allowance systems than on average exist in other countries, but
there is nothing especially unique in this area./l Concerning overtime pay,
the letter of the law requires time and a half for work over 48 hours if
reached by the "mutual agreement" of the parties involved. In practice,
Park (1979) notes, "... overtime work is frequently paid at the straight
hourly rate. No overtime premium is, in fact, almost a customary practice
in most small establishments." /2
What is perhaps most unique to the Korean system are the special
annual payments or bonuses. The bonus system is inherited from the Japanese
and involves lump sum payments which may be seasonal or annual. Originally
introduced during the colonial period (1910-45), and later dismantled during
U.S. military rule (1945-48), bonuses reappeared in the 1950s and are now a
regular feature of Korean enterprises, especially larger ones./3
In Japan, bonus payments are presently seen as a permanent part of
the wage package and in some sense, especially according to unions, are
guaranteed. This, of course, was not the case when the bonus system was
originated. Initially the success of the firm and the performance of an
individual worker determined the extent of the bonus payment.
/1 On this point, Kim (1973, p. 136) writes:
There are a variety of titles of allowances in all countries,
but the number of the titles in Korea is so numerous that it
is hard to enumerate all of them. The names are quite dif-
ferent depending on companies so that there is hardly any
uniformity in the practice of paying allowances in Korean
firms. This suggests that employers by creating a variety
of titles of allowances along with the high percentage of
allowance payments, seem to attempt to give a strong impres-
sion of their benevolent and paternalistic attitudes toward
employees.
/2 Park (1979), p. 96.
/3 Park (1980), p. 91.
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In Korea, the bonus is n.ot guaranteed in most firms. It tends to
reflect business conditions and, therefore, varies across establishments and
over time. During some recent years, successful firms are known to have
awarded 600% bonuses, meaning that workers received, in addition to their
basic pay, the equivalent of 6 months worth of basic wages, usually paid out
on a pro-rated, quarterly basis./l The system extends beyond the private
sector with public enterprise and civil servants receiving analogous pay-
ments. In 1982, civil servants anticipate a 400% bonus. As illustrated in
Table 14a and 14b bonus payments have been becoming an increasingly larger
share of total wage payments since the early 1970s. For both men and women
the increase in the share of bonuses for all workers has almost tripled.
When broken down by education cohort the major cross section finding is as
expected - higher education, reflecting higher salaries and more sophisti-
cated occupation categories, tends to yield greater bonuses. This result
reflects what is true in advanced economies, namely, that higher education
and greater fringe benefits are well correlated./2
In addition to illustrating the evolution of bonus payments over
the 1970s, Table 14a and 14b present the share of wage payments due to
overtime. Again as expected, overtime and educational attainment are
inversely correlated. This is as expected since management and professional
occupations, associated with higher levels of schooling, tend to be salaried
positions and, therefore, overtime work is not recorded. While college,
junior college and high school graduates of both sexes have generally had a
decline in overtime earnings, middle and primary school graduates show
little trend. The lack of an obvious pro-cyclical pattern in overtime pay
is a somewhat surprising finding.
Having described and documented the trend in the structure of
Korean compensation, we now consider the economic implications of these
developments. Our focus will almost exclusively concentrate on the growing
share of bonus payments out of totaLl remuneration.
/1 Park (1979, P. 102) notes:
According to a survey of 983 firms in the manufacturing
industry made in February 1979 by the Korean Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, all firms paid bonuses in 1978.
they ranged from one-half of a month's pay, given once yearly,
to 100 percent of a month's pay given seven times or more in
a year.
Median bonuses were in the 300-399% wage.
/2 Among other things, progressive income taxation of cash earnings in
advanced economies encourages this redistribution of the compensation
package.
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Table 14a: SHARE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION RECEIVED
AS BONUSES AND OVERTIME PAY
(Men, 1971-1981)
Junior High-
Year All College College school Middle Primary
Bonus 1971 .055 .079/a n.a. .064 .038 .028
1972 .043 .067/a n.a. .052 .025 .017
1973 .057 .075/a n.a. .067 .038 .033
1974 .076 .107 .085 .084 .050 .044
1975 .093 .121 .098 .102 .066 .058
1976 .111 .142 .119 .121 .076 .069
1977 .113 .148 .121 .122 .080 .069
1978 .118 .159 .126 .122 .082 .073
1979 .144 .194 .156 .146 .105 .092
1980 .136 .182 .142 .140 .095/b n.a.
1981 .144 .194 .162 .146 .100/b n.a.
Overtime 1971 .199 .140/a n.a. .206 .209 .214
1972 .156 .110/a n.a. .174 .181 .167
1973 .179 .099/a n.a. .175 .206 .201
1974 .166 .102 .128 .178 .211 .197
1975 .164 .094 .121 .178 .214 .201
1976 .161 .065 .093 .174 .248 .237
1977 .133 .045 .079 .135 .211 .212
1978 .142 .050 .079 .139 .222 .217
1979 .155 .064 .098 .152 .231 .234
1980 .135 .047 .077 .135 .250/b n.a.
1981 .154 .040 .066 .131 .214/b n.a.
/a Includes college and junior college graduates.
/b Includes middle and primary school graduates.
Source: Occupational Wage Surveys, MOL.
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Table 14b: SHARE OF TOTAL COMPENSATION RECEIVED
AS BONUSES AND OVERTIME PAY
(Women, 1971-1981)
Junior High-
Year All College College school Middle Primary
Bonus 1971 .044 .058/a n.a. .083 .041 .020
1972 .033 .046/a n.a. .065 .030 .016
1973 .042 .049/a n.a. .072 .041 .022
1974 .039 .051 .061 .090 .042 .032
1975 .067 .093 .087 .108 .061 .039
1976 .085 .132 .109 .135 .074 .055
1977 .084 .149 .117 .117 .079 .059
1978 .087 .149 .130 .130 .077 .050
1979 .107 .166 .143 .153 .093 .070
1980 .105 .182 .154 .138 .082/b n.a.
1981 .112 .179 .165 .154 .084/b n.a.
Overtime 1971 .201 .085/a n.a. .198 .215 .199
1972 .174 .074/a n.a. .150 .193 .189
1973 .181 .072/a n.a. .157 .220 .221
1974 .210 .063 .088 .141 .202 .228
1975 .194 .067 .089 .135 .209 .232
1976 .211 .031 .064 .116 .252 .271
1977 .184 .024 .068 .087 .210 .245
1978 .185 .027 .049 .086 .229 .249
1979 .201 .034 .072 .101 .249 .272
1980 .176 .026 .055 .080 .235/b n.a.
1981 .173 .017 .060 .079 .238/b n.a.
/a Includes college and junior college graduates.
/b Includes middle and primary school graduates.
Source: Occupational Wage Surveys, MOL.
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Korean enterprises may favor granting pay increases through higher
bonuses rather than through raising basic wages for several reasons. Both
basic wages and bonuses are paid after employees have completed the asso-
ciated work for which they are being compensated. However, given the rela-
tive infrequency of bonus payments, firms maintain control over wage funds
longer and thereby enhance their cashflow position. Secondly, both wage
customs and Korean labor legislation tie a variety of compensation benefits
to basic wages not total pay. Bonuses, overtime and severance pay - by law,
one month's basic wages for each year worked /1 - are computed as percent-
ages of basic wages. A firm can, therefore, minimize total labor costs by
granting larger bonuses instead of giving what superficially might appear as
an equivalent increase in basic wages.
Two additional points, both somewhat less obvious than the two
above, may also account for the employer's preference for increasing bonus
over basic wage payments. The first concerns wage policy. Although, as
has been stated elsewhere in this report, the recent history of government
wage guidelines suggests far more of an implicit or indicative policy than
one of strict controls, the potential for tighter controls certainly exists.
Firms, anticipating such government actions, might prefer to keep basic
wages low so as to minimize the potential loss of flexibility in wage
setting that controls would impose. Bonuses are seen as under the discre-
tion of the firm and, at least to some extent, beyond the domain of
government intervention, Increasing the share of bonus payments, therefore,
has increased the margin of potential flexibility in setting wages and
determining labor costs. If the government decides to implement wage
policies in the future, they will need to take account of both basic wages,
special annual earnings and other fringes if the policies are to be
effective.
The next point also refers to the flexibility implied by a more
bonus-oriented system. Firms are able to exercise more control over their
costs by not locking themselves into contractually agreed upon basic wage
payments. Since bonus payments are often a function of the firm's success,
the firm's profits are not the only factor payment which will adjust to
changing business circumstances. Wages as well as profits may fluctuate,
even in the short run, due to the enterprise's circumstances. What the firm
has thus been able to accomplish is to pass off some of the risks inherent
in business activity onto the workers. lihile such a practice is likely to
be good for maintaining profits, it may be viewed as inequitable to the
workers who must bear the risk yet who have no voice in affecting business
outcomes, It may also be ineffic-ent if, at some leTel, entrepreneurial
/1 The Koreans tend not to use the term severance pay but rather refer to
this benefit as a retirement allowance2 The implications of this mis-
nomter are considered below.
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decision-making is weakened by the diminution of associated risks. In
general, the added degree of fleXibility in wage payments enjoyed by the
enterprise is likely to represent the firm's greatest gain from increased
use of the bonus system. At the same time workers may see the flexibility
in their wage receipts as the cost of this payment method. Although in the
current period a pro-business compensation structure may be desirable in
order to maintain already low levels of profits, in the future a move toward
greater reliance on basic wages nmay be to the long run benefit of a well
functioning labor market. If any change in the reliance on bonuses was
desired, a possible starting place could be the public sector where equiva-
lent basic wage payments could replace the present basic wage plus bonus
format. 1
The large shares of total compensation received as bonuses, over-
time and allowances may also impose a social cost due to a reduction in
information available to both firms and workers. Whereas information on
basic wages is easily transferred, the more complex the structure of
compensation, the less likely it is that competitors within the 'Labor market
will be well informed about: available alternatives.
One final point concerns the use of special allowance and fringe
benefits. As in other societies, nonwage perquisites have become a part of
the Korean compensation package. What the trend in these payments has been
is not known, as data to chart these movements are not readily available,
However, by way of an example, we can consider how one benefit - severance
pay - may lead to a distortion in the labor market. For all regular
employees, one month's severance pay is accrued for each year worked. This
money can be collected at the time of termination of employment whether that
termination is due to retirement, a firing or a voluntary quit. Since
severance and other fringes are costs to the firm which grow in relationship
to both the number of regular workers and the level of basic wages, firms
have an incentive to minimize the number of regular employees and to curtail
the growth in basic wages. We have already considered the latter point. As
to the former, rising fringe benefit burdens may induce firms to substitute
away from hiring regular employees and instead increasingly relying on
casuals.
/1 One other possible consequence of the bonus system, especially if it
expands both in terms of share of total compensation and number of
workers affected, is its potential impact on prices. In a world of
imperfect capital markets, the nonrectangular distribution of pay may
generate seasonal price fluctuations linked to the quarterly disburse-
ment of bonus payments. Such ,seasonal demand shocks may create some
degree of seasonal price instability which can be considered as a social
as well as private cost of relying on the bonus system. It should be
noted, however, that this effect, if it exists at all, may be small and
may be of more theoretical interest than of policy significance.
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C. Permanent Employment
In addition to the wage contract between workers and employers,
the employment contract is another essential feature of any industrial labor
relations system. Employment contracts may vary with regard to length of
coverage -- in Korea annual contracts are the rule, protocols for layoffs,
and the overall permanence or commitment, either implicitly or explicitly,
agreed upon by employers and employees. In this section, the permanence of
Korean employment contracts is considered. We have already seen how Korea
has adopted and adapted the Japanese bonus system and now review the signi-
ficance and economic implications of the Japanese lifetime employment
concept as it applies to Korean industry.
There is a considerable debate in the literature over the true
character of lifetime employment in Japan. The origins of this system, its
sociological and anthropological prerequisites, as well as its current
economic costs and benefits are all subject to a variety of interpretations.
For our purposes, we consider permanent employment to be a system whereby
firms guarantee, barring some catastrophic occurrence like bankruptcy,
lifetime employment to a specific subset of workers who in turn have a
commitment to be loyal to the firm and not to seek or accept other employ-
ment opportunities. Workers are willing to accept relocation or any other
reasonable demand made by management. Workers can also count on the
paternalism of the firm and can feel reasonably protected from the vagaries
of business conditions. This system is advantageous to the firm because it
reduces turnover costs while also encouraging human capital investments in
workers. However, the system places an additional fixed cost burden on the
firm, depriving it of some of the flexibility associated with labor as a
variable cost. For the worker, employment security is acquired at the cost
of lower wages, especially at the start of of the working career. A number
of other economic costs and benefits characterize the system, some of which
will be noted below./l It is also important to point out that an entire
sociological system must prevail in order to maintain the nature of the
contract since few of the lifetime provisions are a matter of true legal
precedence. An additional prerequisite is a dual labor market structure in
which a secondary labor market exists which offers no lifetime guarantees
and which absorbs much of the cyclical fluctuations in labor demand
associated with industrial economies.
Whether or not the Koreans have developed an analagous system is
important for several reasons. For one, the ease of inter-firm and inter-
sectoral worker mobility is critical in an economy anticipating major
/1 The interested reader is directed to the literature on Japanese lifetime
employment for a fuller accounting of these costs and benefits. See for
example, Clark (1979) and Cole (1979).
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changes in product mix over the medium-term. Secondly, during economic
downturns, widespread permanent emlployment systems pass the burden of weak
labor demand and industrial un- and underemployment onto firms, thus
relieving some degree of the public sector's responsibility for maintaining
household incomes. Thirdly, these systems tend to buy labor peace and
dampen wage demands, potentially limiting the need for institutional
improvements in the industrial and labor relations arena. We will return to
these issues after considering the state of lifetime employment contracts in
Korea's formal economy.
A diversity of opinions exist concerning the prevalence of lifetime
employment contracts in Korea. In discussions with a small (and non-random)
sample of some of Korea's larger and more successful enterprises, some firms
indicated the existence of permanent employment while others did not. At a
minimum, only management and highly skilled workers would qualify. The bulk
of employees, production workers and unskilled operatives, had no employment
guarantees and, in fact, exhibited very high turnover rates, often in the
neighborhood of 5% per month. The fact that production workers are not
covered is somewhat analagous to the Japanese system although lifetime
employment is likely to extend further down the occupational hierarchy in
Japan than it is in those firms employing the system in Korea.
At a more general level, Korean labor market specialists disagree on
the extent of lifetime employment within Korean firms. Kim Hwang Joe (1973)
argues,
Giving a job is considered as a favor by the newly-
employed. Once they are employed they remain permanently
attached to the firm until the firm is in bankruptcy and
no longer able to employ them. Although the surplus labor
market condition reinforces the tendency of the employee
to attach himself to a firm permanently, the Korean value
system in general considers it immoral for a worker to
change employers because of monetary motivations. It is
also considered immoral for the employer to dismiss a
permanent worker except for the gravest case of moral
turpitude. Under this permanent employment system,
employers can pay low wages under the excuse of inability
to pay./l
Arguing the opposite position, Kim Sookon (1978) writes,
One might expect some similarity between Korea and Japan
in their industrial relations system because of the Far
Eastern cultural characteristics shared by the two
/1 Kim (1973), p. 169.
- 58 -
countries. Surprisingly, however, the results are quite
contrary. Twenty-two percent of the Korean workers
experienced a willingness to move to another company, which
is comparable to the American worker's propensity to
move... we can say that Korean workers feel free to shift
to a different employer whenever a better opportunity
becomes available.../l
Kim Sookon supports his position by citing the results of attitu-
dinal surveys administered to Korean, Japanese and American workers. On
average, Korean responses to questions concerning the degree of their
commitment to their firm more closely resembled American than Japanese
worker responses. However, Korean employees, more than either their
American or Japanese counterparts express the opinion that their firms have
a greater commitment to keeping them employed, even during times of
difficult business conditions./2 This almost suggests a system of tenure -
whereby only the firm, not the workers, guarantees employment -- rather than
one of lifetime employment where the commitment is mutual.
Bai (1977), using similar attitudinal survey techniques, also found
that Korean workers are willing to change jobs for better wages. 52% of his
sample of workers in the Seoul area expressed willingness to leave their
present employers if offered a 20% wage increase elsewhere./2
Although attitudinal data offer insight into worker commitments,
revealed behavior may be a better indicator of the existence of lifetime
employment systems. Unfortunately, the data on job turnover and on
employment tenure are not sufficiently stratified by age, occupation and
sex, to permit accurate testing of the alternative hypotheses. For example,
the very rapid turnover rates experienced by Korean firms, rates which in
the mid-1970s were twice those of Japan's, are not available according to
which of the two labor markets, the one with lifetime guarantees versus the
one without, workers belong. As such, the average turnover figures are not
a good test for the existence of permanent employment set-ups.
The only readily available data for examining the content of firm
specific tenure and hence the prevalence of permanent employment come from
the OWS. Duration with the firm plus total years of job experience are
reported by occupation. These data appear in Table 15. Note that even for
/1 Kim (1978), p. 161, 163.
/2 Kim (1978), pp. 163-70.
/3 Bai (1977), pp. 37-38.
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Table 15: AVERAGE LENGTH OF DURATION AT FIRM AND AVERAGE YEARS
OF JOB EXPERIENCE BY OCCUPATION (1971-81)
Year Professional Administrative Clerical Service Production
1971 4.3/6.8 6.0/9.1 3.6/4.5 2.2/2.9 2.2/2.9
(0.63)/a (0.66) (0.80) (0.76) (0.76)
1972 4.3/6.2 6.2/9.2 3.3/4.2 2.3/3.3 2.3/3.3
(0.69) (0.67) (0.78) (0.70) (0.70)
1973 4.5/7.1 5.4/9.3 3.2/4.5 2.4/3.5 2.2/3.0
(0.63) (0.583) (0.71) (0.69) (0.73)
1974 3.4/4.9 6.0/8.9 3.5/4.6 2.9/3.6 2.4/3.0
(0.69) (0.67) (0.76) (0.81) (0.80)
1975 4.1/6.1 5.5/7.4, 3.3/3.7 2.5/3.0 1.9/2.7
(0.67) (0.74) (0.89) (0.83) (0.70)
1976 4.3/6.5 6.8/8.3 4.1/4.3 3.3/3.7 2.3/3.0
(0.66) (0.82!) (0.95) (0.89) (0.77)
1977 4.4/6.2 5.6/6.7 3.0/3.3 2.9/3.3 2.2/3.2
(0.71) (0.84) (0.91) (0.88) (0.69)
1978 4.1/6.3 5.8/7.7 3.3/3.7 2.9/3.5 2.3/3.3
(0.65) (0.75) (0.89) (0.83) (0.70)
1979 4.3/6.7 i6.5/8.3 3.4/3.9 3.2/3.9 2.3/3.4
(0.64) (0.78,) (0.87) (0.82) (0.67)
1980 4.0/6.3 6.3/8.4 3.3/3.7 3.1/3.7 2.3/3.4
(0.63) (0.75) (0.89) (0.84) (0.67)
1981 4.2/6.5 6.4/11.2 3.6/4.5 3.4/4.6 2.6/4.0
(0.65) (0.57) (0.80) (0.74) (0.65)
/a Ratio of years at firm to years of total job experience.
Source: OWS.
the highest occupations, years of experience in 1981 amounted to only 6.5
and 11.2 years for professional and administrators respectively. Clearly
the youthful nature of the Korean formal sector work force is keeping these
averages low and subsequently making tests for permanent employment diffi-
cult if not premature. By computing the ratio of duration with the firm to
years of job experience we get a crude measure of attachment to the firm.
If permanent employment was prevalent we would expect the highest occupa-
tional categories -- those workers the firm would least like to lose to have
the highest level of worker attaclhment. In fact, the data show the opposite
trend. Less skilled employees, albeit with shorter work experience, have
spent a somewhat larger percentage of their working years with one firm
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throughout most of the 1970s and early 1980s./1 Although not strong
evidence, these results further weaken the notion of widespread Korean
worker commitment to the firm.
The dual of worker commitment to the firm is the firm's commitment
to the worker. For unskilled labor no commitment is apparent. One
Personnel Manager commented that he wished turnover was even more rapid than
the 2-3% per month the plant experienced. If it were, labor costs could be
reduced without any loss in productivity due to the escalation of fringe
benefits as duration with the firm increases. For skilled labor and
managerial positions, firms would like to retain their employees. Fears of
"scouting", that is, pirating by other firms in similar production lines, is
often expressed. However, the desire to maintain experienced professionals
is as much a simple reaction to their scarcity as it is to any specific
institutional arrangement./2 A commitment to maintain skilled workers is
likely to be a feature of many Korean firms but the absence of worker
commitment to the firm signals the limited role of lifetime contracts
currently in use in Korean enterprises.
In recent years, when firms may have wished to lay off employees
due to declining business conditions, government intervention as opposed to
lifetime employment contracts, has acted to discourage if not deny
reductions in work forces. If a firm wishes to discharge workers, a plan
and explanation must be first submitted to the local Ministry of Labor
Office. Such plans can be accepted or denied and the enforcement mechanism
of these policies is part of the intricate web of labor, management, and
government interactions which characterize much of the formal industrial
labor relations system of Korea.
To summarize, it is difficult to fully assess the level of
commitment firms have to their workers for three reasons. One, the high
rate of job turnover, most of it apparently voluntary and, especially for
women, related to Korean patterns of labor force participation, obviates
/1 Not much should be made out of the time series dimension of these data.
If anything, the intertemporal variance suggests potential irregularities
in the data themselves.
/2 Korean enterprises often express a preference for workers who are recent
school graduates or who have not had previous employment. Such atti-
tudes, which are consistent with a permanent employment framework, are
also consistent with attempts to maximize productivity by minimizing the
chances that workers have acquired "bad habits" from other jobs. This
is particularly important for production line work. In this context,
preference for new entrants need not be construed as indicative of a
lifetime employment relationship.
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most of the need for a firm to formulate an employment policy. Second,
limited experience with economic recessions in the last 10-12 years has
provided little stress on employnent demands. Third, government
intervention, often in an implicit manner, disguises the true long-term
character of the firm's position.
For the moment we concLude that lifetime or permanent employment
systems such as those that exist in Japan are not a feature of any signi-
ficant sector of the Korean economy. This is not to say that such a system,
as it did in Japan, will not evo:Lve with changing economic and institutional
circumstances./1 The absence of lifetime employment systems in contemporary
Korea, is important for descripti:ve purposes as well as for policy implica-
tions. The latter might include the following:
(a) continued confidence in labor mobility to support development
of new economic sectors;
(b) greater government responsibility in insuring incomes, if not
employment, during cyclical downturns (a matter of growing
importance given the Korean economy's increasing dependence
on export, and hence exogenous demand);
(c) potential need for greater public investments in job specific
human capital through, for example, training and vocational
centers, due to the limited degree of such investments that
firms, fearing the turnover of trained workers, are willing
to undertake;
(d) the potential need for institutional development of better
industrial and labor relations systems since within-
enterprise system are likely to be insufficient for
facilitating the dialogue between workers and employers over
wage and employment solutions.
In conclusion, the results of this Chapter indicate that although
the Koreans may have adopted aspects of their industrial relations system
from other societies, they have also adapted them to their own
circumstances and now possess syst:ems which are uniquely Korean.
/1 Some economists argue that the Japanese system evolved in,response to
the militancy of trade unions in the late 1940s toward employment
security. Lifetime employment then emerged as a mechanism for buying
labor peace. See Cole (1979).
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4. WAGES, PRICES, PRODUCTIVITY AND EXPORTS
A. Introduction
Since the early 1970s the overall trend in nominal and real
earnings in the Korean formal economy has been generally increasing.
Chapter 2 documented these trends. The implications of these wage movements
are varied. Significant improvements in the real standard of living of many
Koreans have been realized. Within the formal economy, the distribution of
output between profits and earnings has changed with this movement likely to
have favored labor. Wage developments have affected relative factor prices,
which in turn have influenced substitution in industrial production. On a
more macroeconomic level, earnings trends are likely to be implicated in
both the inflationary episodes of the last decade and the changing compara-
tive advantage of Korean exports. Although all of these issues are
deserving of further investigation, the focus of this chapter will be on the
role the labor market played in the price inflation of the late 1970s.
Special attention will be given to the relationship between wage and
productivity growth during this period.
B. The Empirical Context
By late i981 and through the first quarter of 1982 price inflation
was no longer the most pressing issue facing the Korean economy. A recession,
which we have already seen reflected in labor market trends, had become a e
more serious problem. However, in the years prior to the current downturn,
rapid price inflation plagued Korea. In Table 16, using the CPI as an index
of price inflation, annual rates of price increases are seen to have
accelerated from 1976-1980 and to have been sustained at relatively high
levels in 1973-75 and 1979-1981.
Although a variety of factors potentially contributed to the
various inflationary episodes, including oil shocks, exchange rate policy
and international transmission of inflation, our discussion will be limited
to the relationship between wage growth and price increases. In Table 16,
wage and price movements can be easily compared. From 1971-1979 increases
in nominal earnings exceeded the annual percentage change in the CPI. Only
since 1980 have prices surpassed wages, consistent with the earlier finding
of recent real wage decline. That nominal wage increases exceeded price
movements throughout the 1970s is not surprising, since productivity growth
accounts for much of the observed wage trend.
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Table 16: EARNINGS, PRICE MND PRODUCTIVITY TRENDS (1971-81) /a
Annual Percentage Change
Earnings CPI Real earnings Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1971-72 13.9 3.2 2.4 17.3
1972-73 18.0 11.7 2.0 8.8
1973-74 35.3 24.3 14.3 11.4
1974-75 27.0 25.3 8.8 11.6
1975-76 34.7 15.3 1.4 7.5
1976-77 33.8 10.1 16.8 10.4
1977-78 34.3 14.4 21.5 12.0
1978-79 28.6 18.3 17.4 15.8
1979-80 22.7 28.7 8.7 10.7
1980-81 20.1 23.3 -4.7 15.8
/a Earnings and productivity refer to the manufacturing sector only.
Source: Monthly Wage Survey.
Real earnings, however, only exceeded productivity growth in 1973, and then
again during the period of Korea's most rapid output expansion, 1976-78.
These years are also coincident wiLth the period of escalating price increases
and precede the high inflation levels of 1979-81, leading some observers to
cite wages as the primary cause of price inflation during these periods./l
It is worth noting that a divergence between earnings and produc-
tivity growth in Korea is not a netw phenomenon. Moran, in a study of the
years 1963-1974 found the following to be true for data on the entire
economy:
Although the real wage per worker grew by the same proportion
as value added per worker during the entire 1962-74 period,
there was much leapfrogging between these two variables. For
example, between 1966 and 1970 the real average wage grew more
/1 Clearly much of this interpretation depends on the measure of produc-
tivity which is chosen. A more complete discussion of productivity
measures is contained in the Annex to this chapter.
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than 75% faster than output per worker; between 1970 and 1974
productivity grew almost 50% faster than the real average wage.
Average real wages have apparently been growing in a typical
lagged-response pattern to spurts in productivity through the
period./I
Given this observed pattern of wage, price and productivity growth, what now
concerns us are the conclusions that can be drawn regarding the role of
wage increases in generating domestic price inflation, especially during the
late 1970s. To attempt to answer this question some alternative theoretical
frameworks are considered below.
C. Theoretical Background
The intent of this section is not to review the literature on the
determinants of price inflation. The aim is simply to consider what
alternative models of inflation are consistent with recent macroeconomic
trends in Korea.
Inspection of the real wage and productivity trends might lead one
to conclude that cost-push pressures were responsible for price inflation.
Certainly, if labor was able to demand wages which surpassed productivity
growth, a wage-price spiral could follow. However, cost-push models tend to
require some monopoly power on the part of labor. Such power, after all, is
seen as necessary if labor is to "force" profit conscious firms into paying
wages greater than those dictated by productivity. This wage/productivity
gap can be generated by powerful trade unions, by wage demands which are
strongly supported by the government, and/or by wage customs on other
institutions which act to maintain wage rigidities across workers regardless
of individual trends in productivity. Cost-push inflations also tend to be
associated with declines in capacity utilization and hence output growth.
This is because profit receivers are no longer willing to provide former
levels of capital at the now lower rates of return. (This interpretation of
cost-push inflations led Gordon (1978) to conclude that the only U.S.
inflation since WWI that was cost-push induced was the 1973-75 episode
resulting from oil and raw material price shocks.)
For a variety of reasons, cost-push arguments are not a totally
satisfactory explanation of the Korean inflation of the late 1970s. Output
growth was rising not declining during the period 1975-79,/2 although profit
margins were shrinking. This suggests that capital owners were not
/1 Moran (1976) p.199.
/2 After 1979, price inflation exceeded wage inflation, suggesting that
cost-push pressures were not likely to be a primary determinant of price
rises.
completely discouraged by trends in rates of returns. Furthermore, it
is difficult to identify any monopoly element bargaining for labor's
position. The Korean trade union movement was seriously emasculated by
government actions throughout the 70s and does not appear to have been in a
position to extract any monopoly rents. Government wage policy on the other
hand, although pro-labor during these years, is unlikely to have been the
dominant factor in pushing wage increases beyond productivity gains. In the
competitive output markets which many Korean firms faced, it is unlikely
that a wage policy which was not designed to be strongly enforced through
institutional controls could have maintained the observed wage/productivity
wedge over several years. As for wage customs and other wage-setting
institutions, the responsiveness of wage differentials to overall macro-
economic trends, cited earlier, suggests some weakness in wage rigidities as
either a primary source of cost-push pressures or as the chief explanation
of price inflation during this per-Lod. By not being able to readily iden-
tify the force behind a cost-push drive, this explanation of the wage-price
spiral loses some of its its appeal, regardless of the observed wage/
productivity trend.
Setting aside wage based cost-push explanations, the next obvious
candidate is demand-pull. For our purposes, what is of interest is whether
demand-pull arguments can account for the observed wage/productivity gap and
wage-price spiral. Simply stated, if the Korean economy was experiencing
tight labor markets in the late 1970s, productivity growth, inherently a
physical not nominal concept, would not have been expected to significantly
deviate from the long run trends. Wage increases, meanwhile, may have
accelerated as firms bid up labor prices due to the short-run scarcity of
manpower. Assuming that such behavior was ultimately accomodated by
monetary authorities, a wage/productivity gap could have emerged due to the
pressures of excess demand for labor. Once the competitive bidding for
labor began, a wage-price spiral, as maintained by the data, may have
followed./l
That a widening gap betweien real earnings and measured producti-
vity emerged in the late 1970s cannot be denied. That rapid price inflation
followed this event is also apparent. However, what must be emphasized is
that the ultimate determinant of these trends, the force which set these
events in motion, need not have originated in the labor market. Although
cost-push factors at some level were operative -- wages did rise faster than
prices, the escalation in wages may have been due to demand pressures
emanating from firms, rather than from wage demands orchestrated by the
/1 That excess demand bid up wages faster, or at least sooner, than prices
is consistent with both the significant share of output and the growth
in demand for Korean exports. lThis external expansionary force first
affected labor demand and then wages, which in turn may have translated
into increases in the domestic price level.
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suppliers of labor services./l These alternative interpretations must be
carefully assessed since the policy implications which follow will vary. In
the future, if analogous inflationary episodes repeat themselves, a wage
policy "with teeth" may prove to be effective if cost-push is the ultimate
determinant of price movements. However, such a policy, although capable of
maintaining profit shares in the short run, will not address the fundamental
imbalances which are present if excess demand and hence, demandpull forces,
initiate the wage-price reactions. Furthermore, a wage policy "with teeth"
under conditions of excess demand might produce serious inefficiencies in
the allocation of labor, since the market would no longer be permitted "to
ration" scarce labor. Firms would be encouraged to find ways of cheating
the wage guidelines, and bottlenecks resulting from inadequate matching of
labor supplies and demands at the controlled wages might be anticipated. In
this instance, any gains in reducing price inflation through wage controls
could easily be at the expense of efficiency in factor markets and hence the
resulting level of national output. It is unlikely, in the long run, that
such a tradeoff would be in the economy's best interest.
/1 Kendrick (1977), one of the recognized experts on productivity, genera-
lizes this point. He notes:
i.. t is obvious that in order to have a stable general
price level, average input prices must rise no more than
in proportion to total factor productivity. When they do,
it is of course no proof of cost-push inflation. Even if
increases in aggregate demand are outrunning increases in
supply and pulling product prices up, input prices will
still rise by more in proportion to productivity. This is
because demand-pull inflation first acts to raise profit
margins, which are reflected in the factor price measures,
and subsequently tends to accelerate increases in wage-
rates, the major component of factor prices. In other
periods, however, when demand-pull is not evident, as
indicated by excess capacity and stable or falling profit
margins, an increase in factor prices (predominantly wage-
rates) greater than the rise in productivity is generally
viewed as evidence of cost push.
ANNEX
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A Final Word on Productivity Trends
Given the importance atltached to measured productivity trends in
assessing macroeconomic developments,/1 it is worth considering some
measurement issues concerning Korea's productivity statistics. According to
the received theory, wage and productivity trends are expected to be well
correlated over the long run. For the U.S., the trend in real average
hourly earnings is very close to t:he trend in output per hour for the 30
years, 1945-75./2 The theoretical explanation is based on neoclassical
competitive equilibrium conditions. In the long run firms are expected to
produce where marginal costs equal average costs, implying that marginal
products of all factors will equal. their average products. With regard to
labor, average products are the traditional empirical measure of producti-
vity. Since profit maximizing firms employ labor to the point where real
wages equal marginal products, we expect that real wages will equal produc-
tivity in the long run. This equilibrium condition further implies that
real wage growth will equal productivity growth.
As Figure V suggests and as noted earlier, real wages in
manufacturing and productivity trends in that sector have not been "almost
equal" over the 1970s. In the previous section, we considered some
macroeconomic explanations for this observed trend. In this section we
briefly discuss some measurement problems./3
The most commonly referred to productivity trend in Korea is
compiled by the Korean Productivity Center. This quasi-government agency
receives output and input data from a National Bureau of Statistics monthly
survey of selected establishments. The output index is based on actual
quantities produced, not on the vaLue of production. Aggregation is achieved
by means of value added weights pertaining to value added in the base year,
1975. Multi-product firms pose special problems given this formulation.
/1 One can further appreciate the significance of measured productivity
growth by realizing that the Korean government's implicit wage guideline
in 1979 was that wage increases should equal national productivity
increases. Needless to say, the economic and political impact of
measured productivity, at least in 1979, was considerable.
/2 Kendrick (1977) p. 80.
/3 It should be noted that in Moran's (1976) work on wages and productivity,
real compensation per worker exceeded real value added per worker from
1967-1974. Prior to 1967, wages and productivity were more closely
aligned. Moran's data, which might extend the observed wage/productivity
gap from 1967-80 are, however, based on economy-wide data derived from GDP
accounts while our data refer primarily to manufacturing.
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The input index is based on man-days of production workers per
month. Unlike the output series which is based on a 5-digit SIC classifica-
tion, input data are organized at a 3-digit level. Furthermore, the input
series is weighted by share of total man-hours in the base year rather than
by the value added weights used in the output series. The ratio of the input
and output series appears as a quarterly estimate of productivity for all
industry/I as well as for approximately 30 industrial disaggregations.
A number of Korean economists and statisticians have pointed out
numerous weaknesses in the measured statistics./2 Unfortunately, the biases
do not all work in the same direction. For one, the use of different
weighting schemes in the output and input series can cause statistical arti-
facts irrespective of any change in output per worker. Second, the use of
man-days rather than man-hours, fails to reflect the impact of overtime work,
which, in fact, varies over the business cycle, and hence biases the statis-
tics upward during cyclical peaks. Third, the use of 1975 value added
weights fails to capture the significant changes in output composition which
have taken place since 1975. In fact, those new industries, such as steel,
electronics and shipbuilding, which are likely to have had large capital
investments and labor productivity growth since 1975, are precisely those
industries which contribute little to the aggregate productivity measure due
to their small contribution to value added in 1975. This is likely, on net,
to produce a downward bias in the statistic.
As an alternative to the Korean Productivity Center's series one
can compute the trend in real value added per worker based on mining and
manufacturing data. The correlation between the two series equals .88
and after 1975 the real value added per worker trend provides an
equally poor fit relative to the real earnings trend (see Table A3 below).
What this discussion of productivity measurement is meant to
emphasize are the limitations of the available data. Whether Korean pro-
ductivity data are less reliable t:han similar data for other nations is open
to debate, although some of the Korean computation techniques do stand out
as particularly weak. However, a;Ll productivity measures are known to be
crude approximations and in a rapidly changing economy like Korea's during
the '70s, the weaknesses of these measures may be even more profound. Recog-
nition of these problems should, at a minimum, reinforce an earlier point,
that the observed wage/productivity gap should not be used as the critical
piece of evidence supporting any particular theory of labor market and macro-
economic interactions.
/1 This includes manufacturing, mining and electricity.
/2 See Park (1980) and Yoo (1982).
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Table A3: COMPARISON OF PRODUCTIVITY AND EARNINGS MEASURES IN MANUFACTURING
(1971-81; 1975 = 100)
Productivity
Year Real Earnings KPC VA/L
1971 77.7 63.0 74.1
1972 79.3 73.9 75.1
1973 90.6 80.4 88.4
1974 97.4 89.6 95.9
1975 100.0 100.0 100.0
1976 116.8 107.5 105.0
1977 141.9 118.7 118.0
1978 166.6 132.9 138.2
1979 181.2 153.9 126.7
1980 172.7 170.3 136.4
1981 168.2 197.2 n.a.
Definitions and Sources:
(a) Real Earnings = Average monthly earnings for all workers in
manufacturing from Monthly Wage Survey.
(b) Productivity = (i) KPC measure - see text.
(ii) Real value added divided by number of employees
in entire manufacturing sector, according to
Mining and Manufacturing Surveys.
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THE NATURE OF KOREAN LABOR MARKET DATA
The Appendix reviews available sources of Korean labor market
information. The Korean government has amassed an impressive collection of
official labor market data spanning, in most instances, the period 1970
through the present. The available data make possible a more exhaustive
analysis of wage and employment trends than could be attempted in many other
nations. However, it is important to emphasize the basic limitations of the
data imposed by the coverage of Korean wage and employment surveys. By not
reflecting the conditions of the small-scale or informal economy, the data
portray only a percentage of the nonagricultural work force. In order to
avoid making inaccurate economy wide generalizations based solely on these
formal economy statistics, this chapter provides estimates of the relative
size of the formal and informal sectors. It also documents the alternative
sources of Korean labor market information which are relied upon throughout
this report.
Most Korean labor market information is summarized in the Ministry
of Labor's annual Yearbook of Labor Statistics. This yearbook provides the
major findings of the Ministry's own survey work including the Monthly Wage
Survey, Actual Labor Conditions of Establishments (quarterly) and Occupational
Wage Survey (annual). The Yearbook additionally provides data compiled
from the National Bureau of Statistics' Economically Active Population Survey
(quarterly). Information on, among other things, prices, productivity
trends and registered labor dispuites is also reported.
The data on earnings are collected solely by the Ministry of Labor
while employment statistics are generated by several sources. By comparing
the employment profiles from Ministry of Labor reports with the profiles of
more global surveys, it is possible to determine the boundaries of Ministry
of Labor earnings data. In Table 18 information on employment by economic
sector from different sources is compared. In the first column, the results
of the 1979 /1 Economically Active Population Survey (EAPS) are presented.
This survey is household based ancl is administered to approximately 15,000
families nationwide, yielding responses from some 45,000 civilians 14 years
and older. If we accept the Economically Active Population Survey
projection of 14.2 million people falling into this category nationwide, the
survey translates into roughly a 3 per 1,000 sample.
/1 The year 1979 was chosen for comparison because it is the most recent
year for which a complete set of independent estimates from alternative
sources is available. Note also that Population Census data would have
been an ideal source for conducting the consistency/boundary analysis
being developed. However, no preliminary results from the 1980 Census
are available.
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Table 18: EMPLOYMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTOR (1979)
ACCORDING TO ALTERNATIVE SOURCES
(In thousands of workers)
Industry EAPS ALCE MWS OWS Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1. Total employment 13,664 3,345 2,735 2,839 n.a.
2. Agriculture /a 4,887 22 n.a. 10 n.a.
3. Mining 111 74 67 70 80
4. Manufacturing 3,126 2,155 1,921 1,999 2,116
5. Construction 836 280 86 87 475
6. Social overhead capital
and other services 4,704 814 661 673 n.a.
7. Electricity /b n.a. 23 21 22 19
8. Commerce /c n.a. 211 109 113 1,363
9. Transport 7d n.a. 250 240 244 404
10. Finance /e n.a. 164 148 149 n.a.
11. Personal services n.a. 166 143 145 n.a.
12. Public sector n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 664/f
/a Includes agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting.
lb Includes electricity, water and gas in columns (2), (3) and (4) and only
electricity in column (3).
/c Includes wholesale and retail trade as well as hotels and restaurants.
Id Includes transport, storage and communication in columns (2), (3) and (4),
and only transport in column (5)
/e Includes financing, insurance, real estate and business services.
/f This figure includes 582,000 employees of the national government as well
as 82,000 public enterprise workers. (The latter statistic was supplied
by the KDI).
Sources: Economically Active Population Survey, National Bureau of Statistics,
EPB. Includes civilian and noninstitutional population 14 years
old and over.
Actual labor conditions at establishment, Ministry of Labor.
Includes establishments of 5 or more workers excluding public
employment.
Monthly Wage Survey, Ministry of Labor. Includes establishments of
10 or more workers excluding public employment and agriculture,
forestry, hunting and fishing.
Occupational Wage Survey, Ministry of Labor. Includes establishments
of 10 or more workers excluding public employment.
All figures are reported in Korea: Statistical Yearbook 1981,
Bureau of Statistics, EPB. This volume is a compilation of other
surveys. We report employment from the surveys of Mining and
Manufacturing, Construction, Electricity, Wholesale and Retail
Trade, Transportation and Government Administration.
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In columns 2, 3 and 4 the results of three different Ministry of
Labor surveys are reported. In column 2, employment data from the Actual
Labor Conditions of Establishments (ACLE) are presented. This survey covers
establishments of 5 or more workers, excluding all public sector employment.
No wage data are reported in this survey. Columns 3 and 4 correspond to
the Monthly Wage Survey (MWS) and Occupational Wage Survey (OWS) respec-
tively. These surveys are administered to 3,865 firms, employing 10 or more
workers,/1 and contain detailed information on earnings by economic sectors.
According to the Ministry of Labor, the establishment surveys of firms with
10 or more workers are 8.5% samples of the population of registered firms.
Column 5 presents employment estimates obtained from survey and
census reports of individual government ministries. These data yield
estimates for sectors not covered by the Ministry of Labor (e.g. public
employment) while they also provide independent consistency checks of other
employment estimates.
According to row 1 of Table 18, the available earnings data -
information contained in only the IMWS and OWS - correspond to only 1/3 of
total private, nonagricultural employment. In other words, for some 5 1/2
million workers we have no corresponding earnings data. Table 18 suggests
that these workers are most concentrated in the Social Overhead Capital and
Other Services sector. In fact, 74% of the workers "missing" earnings data
are in this sector, another 22% are! reported to be in manufacturing with the
remaining percentages scattered across other sectors. These data illustrate
the extent of the Korean small-scale sector which, by definition, is
excluded from the earnings surveys./2
The significance of the small-scale sector can be further
documented. First, examine row 8 of Table 18 which reports employment in the
Commerce sector, i.e. wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants.
The 1979 Census of this sector reports that 90% of the sector's 1,363,000
workers (column (4)) are emp:Loyed in firms of fewer than 10 persons.
Clearly the Ministry of Labor earnings data on formal employment in this
sector, representing only slightly more than 100,000 workers (columns (3)
and (4)), cannot be construed as representative of the entire sector.
Parallel to the larger firms exists a vast informal economy.
/1 The sample is based on stratified random sampling with a larger share
of large firms included in the sample. The sample is redrawn every 3
years. Prior to redrawing a new sample, firms which are lost to the
sample are replaced through random selection procedures.
/2 Problems of definition and of sampling bias will, of course, affect the
actual percentages reported by the cross-survey comparison above and,
therefore, the specific numbers should only be considered as suggestive
of formal/informal sector employment shares. However, the basic conclu-
sion on the significance of the small-scale sector seems robust.
4- APPENDIX
The small-scale economy is also made apparent by the Economically
_6Z-ive Population Survey's reporting of employment by class of workers. In
1979 (see Table 19 below), for economically active persons in non-farm house-
biolds, which roughly corresponds to non-agricultural employment, close to
I/3 of all workers are self-employed or family workers. These individuals
constitute a significant percentage of the informal economy and their earn-
ings are not captured by any official survey.
Table 19: PERSONS EMPLOYED BY CLASS OF WORKER (1979)
(Non-Farm Households Only; '000 Workers)
Family Regular Temporary
Self-Employed Workers Employees Employees Daily Workers Total
2124 548 3,665 977 994 8,308
Source: EAPS, EPB.
Given the importance of the manufacturing sector in the Korean
ecorLOiy, it is worth commenting on the consistency of its employment statis-
tics (Table 18, row (4)). The Mining and Manufacturing Survey conducted by
chie Economic Planning Board reports total employment of 2,116 thousand
-Jorkers in 1979 in firms of at least 5 employees. For firms employing 10
O-r more workers the corresponding total is 2,041 thousand. Both figures
,ompare favorably with the results of the Monthly and Occupational Wage
3Irveys, our primary sources of earnings data,/l with a discrepancy in the
rt range. The similarity of the employment figures for the formal manu-
racturing sector suggests robustness in the data available to portray this
teadThg sector of the economy. The residual estimate of informal manu-
r-aouring employment of almost 1 million workers (row 4, column (1) - (2))
points to the significance of the "uncovered" sector.
In an analysis of the size of the informal economy analagous to
7-his one Bai (1981) estimates employment, in what he refers to as the urban
r eadir-orial sector, equal to only 50% rather than our 66%, of nonagricultural
eplay>i-nt. His estimate is lower than ours because he subtracts an estimate
oi-naaarm agricultural employment from the Economically Active Population
S-evs estimate of nonagricultural employment. Although somewhat differ-
ent both estimates of the size of the informal economy do point out the
li-itations in generalizing about the entire economy from Ministry of Labor
earrings data.
/f Differences between the MWS and OWS can be attributed to differences in
sampling period. The MWS reports the average monthly experience while
tchc OWS refers only to the actual survey period.
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Although representing only 1/3 - 1/2 of total private nonagricu-
tural employment, Ministry of Labor earnings data might still be appro-
priately used for some economy-wide generalizations if they were believed
to be proportionately representative of total employment. Table 20 reveals
that the occupation distribution generated by the Economically Active Popu-
lation Survey does not closely correspond with that of the Occupational FWage
Survey (OWS). The latter survey is more heavily weighted toward production
and clerical work, reflecting the occupation structure of the formal economy,
which is dominated by manufacturing and by a generally large-scale and more
bureaucratic industrial organization.
Table 20: COMPARISON OF OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION (1980)
NONAGRICULTURAL WORKERS ONLY
('000 Workers)
EAPS OWIS
Occupation l'otal % Total X
Professional 730 (8.1) 262 (9.6)
Clerical 1,266 (14.0) 575 (21.1)
Sales 1,983 (21.9) 13 (0.5)
Service 1,085 (12.0) 121 (4.4)
Production 3,990 (44.0) 755 (64.4)
Total 9,054 (100.0) 2,726 (100.0)
Source: Economically Active Population Survey, National
Bureau of Statistics, EPB; Occupational Wage
Survey, Ministry of Labor.
The limitations of the avrailable Korean earnings data point up a
basic weakness of Korean statisticaLl coverage, namely, the absence of a
broadly based, multi-purpose, nationwide household survey./l Bhalla (1979)
/1 It is worth noting that the Family Income and Expenditure survey of
urban housholds does provide some household based data on earnings.
However, this survey is primarily used for price index issues and little
earnings information is published. Furthermore, Korean statisticians
familiar with the survey did not express confidence in this area of the
survey. Perhaps in the future this survey could be augmented for
improved earnings data collection.
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also points out the need for such a survey in his in-depth review of data on
household incomes in Korea. Bhalla's interest is to portray the biases
inherent in analyses of Korea's distribution of income. He notes that
existing surveys fail to include at least 19-25% of the nation's households.
Bhalla concludes that without information on these households, little
confidence can be placed on the derived estimate of improvements in the
Korean distribution of income. Although we share Bhalla's concern, our
problem is only partially analagous. Confidence can be placed on the data
reflecting the formal economy, however, it must be recognized that few
empirical generalizations can be offered on the remaining and rather
substantial informal sectors.
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